Filed: Apr. 02, 2014
Latest Update: Apr. 02, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 3, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until June 26, 2014, and to exclude time between April 3, 2014, and June 26, 2014, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The go
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 3, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until June 26, 2014, and to exclude time between April 3, 2014, and June 26, 2014, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The gov..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 3, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until June 26, 2014, and to exclude time between April 3, 2014, and June 26, 2014, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, recorded telephone conversations, and CD totaling 132 batestamped pages. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his clients, review the evidence, conduct further defense investigation, including retesting controlled substances and discussing potential resolutions short of jury trial.
c) Counsel for defendant believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 3, 2014 to June 26, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
