Filed: Apr. 09, 2014
Latest Update: Apr. 09, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING VACATING TRIAL DATE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, District Judge. Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for trial on May 13, 2014, and time was excluded to and through May 13, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to vacate t
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING VACATING TRIAL DATE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, District Judge. Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for trial on May 13, 2014, and time was excluded to and through May 13, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to vacate th..
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STIPULATION REGARDING VACATING TRIAL DATE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION
LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for trial on May 13, 2014, and time was excluded to and through May 13, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to vacate the trial date and set the matter for a change of plea on Monday, May 19, 2014, at 10:00 a.m.
3. The parties further move to exclude time between May 13 and May 19, 2014, for further investigation and plea negotiations based on new and developing information.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the parties desires additional time to conduct further investigation in light of new and developing information and consider the terms and sentencing ramifications of a plea agreement based on the new information.
b. Counsel for the parties believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation and resolution, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 13, 2014, to May 19, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv), because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
