JAMES K. SINGLETON, Jr., Senior District Judge.
John Gonzalez Joseph, a state prisoner represented by counsel, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. At the time he filed his Petition, Joseph was in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and incarcerated at California State Prison-Solano. It appears that he has been released on supervised parole, as a search on the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's inmate locator website (http://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/, Inmate No. K67634) has no record of him. Respondent has answered, and Joseph has replied. As of June 22, 2012, the date his counsel filed the Traverse, it appears that Joseph was still incarcerated at Solano. He has not filed a change of address with this Court.
Upon direct appeal of his conviction, the California Court of Appeal summarized the following facts underlying Joseph's conviction:
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment against Joseph in a reasoned opinion.
On April 5, 2010, Joseph, represented by counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles County Superior Court challenging the September 30, 2009, decision of the Board of Parole Hearings ("Board") finding Joseph unsuitable for parole. The superior court denied the petition, finding that the Board's decision denying Joseph parole was properly supported by evidence that his release would pose a risk of danger to public safety, as required by California law.
Joseph's attorney then filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, again arguing that the Board violated Joseph's due process rights "because there was not some evidence in the record to support its finding that he poses a current unreasonable risk to public safety." The appellate court summarily denied the petition on October 1, 2010.
Again proceeding through counsel, Joseph filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. He argued before that court that the Board's "unlawful practice of denying parole in 99.7% of initial parole hearings deprived Mr. Joseph of an individualized consideration for parole." The petition was denied without comment on December 1, 2010.
Joseph timely filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court. He subsequently retained counsel, who was appointed as attorney of record on February 25, 2011.
Joseph asserts the following grounds for habeas relief: (1) "the Board's unlawful practice of denying parole in 99.7% of initial parole hearings deprived Mr. Joseph of an individualized consideration for parole"; (2) the Board violated Joseph's due process rights because there was not "some evidence" in the record to support its finding that Joseph posed a current unreasonable risk to public safety; and (3) the amendments made by California's Marsy's law
On June 7, 2011, the Magistrate Judge assigned to this case issued an Order & Findings and Recommendations recommending that claims 2 and 3 be dismissed from the Petition as barred by Supreme Court precedent and a pending federal class action. Docket No. 5. On April 26, 2011, the Findings and Recommendations were re-designated as an order dismissing claims 2 and 3 from the Petition. Docket No. 15. In light of these proceedings, the only claim presently before this Court is Joseph's first claim that "the Board's unlawful practice of denying parole in 99.7% of initial parole hearings deprived Mr. Joseph of an individualized consideration for parole."
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). A state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts controlling Supreme Court authority or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision" of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000).
In this regard, a federal habeas court "may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 412; see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63; 75 (2003) (it is "not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a `firm conviction' that the state court was `erroneous'" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Supreme Court has explained that "clearly established Federal law" in § 2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. The holding must also be intended to be binding upon the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002). Where holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, "it cannot be said that the state court `unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.'" Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (citation omitted).
To the extent that a petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) (holding that it is of no federal concern whether state law was correctly applied). It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot reexamine a state court's interpretation and application of state law); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (presuming that the state court knew and correctly applied state law), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Under the AEDPA, the state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
In applying these standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the "last reasoned decision" by the state court. See Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)). If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2011); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). "Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable." Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of "showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011).
Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution requires the existence of a case or controversy through all stages of federal judicial proceedings. This means that, throughout the litigation, the petitioner "must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (citations omitted); see also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) ("The rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed."). If an event occurs subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit which deprives a court of the ability to provide meaningful relief, the case becomes moot and is subject to dismissal. See United States v. Alder Creek Water Co., 823 F.2d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1987) ("A case becomes moot when interim relief or events have deprived the court of the ability to redress the party's injuries."). Similarly, a claim for habeas relief becomes moot when the controversy between the parties is no longer alive because the party seeking relief has obtained the relief requested. See, e.g., Picrin-Peron v. Rison, 930 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 1991) (a claim is moot when the court no longer has power to grant the requested relief).
As previously noted, it appears that Joseph has been released from state incarceration and is now on supervised release. Because Joseph has not completed the maximum sentence imposed of sixteen years to life, it appears that Joseph was granted parole and thus has already achieved the remedy he seeks; this Court can therefore no longer grant Joseph further relief on any claim contained in his Petition. See Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-238 (1968) (noting in part that a habeas corpus petition becomes moot upon the petitioner being released from custody unless the petitioner has demonstrated an ongoing collateral consequence); Picrin-Peron, 930 F.2d at 776 (finding that a claim is moot when the court no longer has power to grant the requested relief); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 493 (1973) (stating that damages are not available in a habeas corpus petition). As a result, the present case has been rendered moot and must be dismissed.
Even assuming that Joseph's claim has not been mooted, Joseph still could not prevail on the merits of his claim that the Board demonstrated systematic bias and applied an anti-parole policy in his case in violation of due process.
The Due Process Clause includes a "basic requirement" of a "fair trial in a fair tribunal." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that California inmates have a due process right to parole consideration by neutral decisionmakers. See O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1990). "Because parole board officials perform tasks that are functionally comparable to those performed by the judiciary, they owe the same duty: `to render impartial decisions in cases and controversies that excite strong feelings because the litigant's liberty is at stake.'" Id. (quoting Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982) ("[D]ue process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities." (citations omitted)).
"In attempting to make out a claim of unconstitutional bias, a plaintiff must `overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity' on the part of decision-makers" and "show that the adjudicator `has prejudged, or reasonably appears to have prejudged, an issue.'" Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992).
In considering Joseph's claim in his state habeas petition that there was no evidence in the record to support the Board's finding that Joseph posed a current unreasonable risk to public safety, the superior court noted:
The record therefore demonstrates that the Board properly considered the evidence at Joseph's hearing and made a thoughtful decision based on an individualized assessment of Joseph's circumstances. The only support Joseph gives for his assertion that the Board denied him an individualized assessment is the fact that the Board has denied parole in 99.7% of the initial parole determinations it has issued. But that lone statistic is insufficient to rebut the presumption of honesty and integrity afforded to the decisionmakers. See Stivers, 71 F.3d at 741. This is particularly true where the record indicates that Joseph was given a full and extensive parole hearing where he was allowed to address the Board and was given a prisoner evaluation report and comprehensive risk assessment prior to the Board's determination. See Orozco v. Clark, 705 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1174-75 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (finding on similar record that petitioner failed to show due process violation based on Board's alleged no-parole policy); Hardwick v. Clarke, No. CIV S-06-0672, 2010 WL 1444575, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010) (same); Brazil v. Davison, 639 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1154-57 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (same).
Accordingly, Joseph cannot prevail on this claim in any event.
Joseph is not entitled to relief on any ground raised in his Petition.
The Clerk of the Court is to enter judgment accordingly.
