STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendants, by and through each counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 1, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until June 19, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude the time period between the date of this stipulation, April 28, 2014, and the proposed new status conference hearing date, June 19, 2014, from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find and order the following:

a. The government initially provided 32 pages of investigative reports. These reports show that there are additional audio and video recordings and other evidence available for inspection and copying. Defense counsel for defendant Venegas has provided documents and other materials as reciprocal discovery to the government. The government reviewed the materials and the parties are engaged in plea negotiations. Defense counsel for Mr. Venegas needs additional time to determine whether additional plea negotiations will be fruitful and to fully advise defendant Venegas about the consequences if there is a conviction after trial.

b. Counsel for the defendants also desire additional time to consult with their respective clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

c. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period from the date of this stipulation, April 28, 2014, to and including the date of the proposed new status conference, June 19, 2014, shall be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and B(iv) and Local Code T4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

UPON GOOD CAUSE SHOWN and the stipulation of all parties, it is ordered that the May 1, 2014, status conference hearing be continued to June 19, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. Based on the representation of defense counsel and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court hereby finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. It is ordered that time beginning from the parties' stipulation, April 28, 2014, up to and including the June 19, 2014, status conference shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T-4, to allow defense counsel reasonable time to prepare.

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.