STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

ALLISON CLAIRE, Magistrate Judge.

STIPULATION

Defendant, by and through his counsel of record, together with Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 16, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to vacate the status conference and to set the matter for trial on June 23, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 26, and to exclude time between May 16, 2014 and June 23, 2014 under Local Code T4. Defendant further moves to waive any further status conference. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. Defense counsel was recently appointed to this matter and is still undergoing investigation and research in order to adequately advise Mr. Cruz of his interests, rights and in addition fully and adequately prepare his case for trial.

b. Based on defense counsel's ongoing communication with both Mr. Cruz and the U.S. Attorney, it appears extremely unlikely that the matter will resolve. Therefore it appears to be most efficient at this time to set the future date as an actual trial date rather than status conference. Setting the trial on the date of June 23, 2014 appears to defense counsel to provide adequate time to prepare defense investigation and legal arguments for this case.

c. The government does not object to the continuance.

d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 16, 2014 to June 23, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED