STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER AS TO DEFENDANT MARIO LOPEZ-ALAYA

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

STIPULATION

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 22, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, defendant Mario Lopez-Ayala only now moves to continue this matter to June 19, 2014 for a change of plea hearing, and to exclude time between May 22, 2014, and June 19, 2014, under Local Code T4.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 700 pages of documents and photographs, including investigative reports. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.

b) The United States has provided a plea agreement to defendant Lopez-Ayala. Counsel has requested additional time to research matters related to the potential sentencing issues in this case and to review discovery with respect to the terms of the agreements, and consult with her client regarding implications for trial.

c) Counsel for defendant Lopez-Alaya requests that the matter be set for change of plea on June 19, 2014.

d) Counsel for defendant Lopez-Alaya believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e) The United States does not object to the continuance.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 22, 2014 to June 19, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.