JAMES K. SINGLETON, Jr., Senior District Judge.
Daniel Snowden, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Snowden is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and incarcerated at California State Prison-Corcoran. Respondent has answered, and Snowden has replied.
On January 5, 2007, Snowden was charged with one count of kidnapping, one count of kidnapping with the intent to commit rape, two counts of forcible rape, two counts of forcible sexual penetration, two counts of sexual battery, one count of forcible oral copulation, one count of false imprisonment, one count of robbery, and one count of assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force. The information further alleged numerous enhancements with regard to the offenses. On direct appeal of his conviction, the California Court of Appeal recounted the following facts underlying the indictment:
People v. Snowden, No. C058667, 2009 WL 3165445, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2009).
On December 5, 2007, Snowden waived his right to a jury trial and a bench trial commenced. On January 18, 2008, the court found Snowden guilty of one count of kidnapping with the intent to commit rape, two counts of forcible rape, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of assault and found true the enhancements and alternate penalty provisions alleged on each count. On March 14, 2008, the court sentenced Snowden to an aggregate imprisonment term of 13 years plus a consecutive term of 50 years to life.
Through counsel, Snowden appealed his conviction, arguing that: 1) he did not make a knowing waiver of his right to a jury trial; 2) the evidence was insufficient to support the false imprisonment conviction; 3) false imprisonment is a lesser included offense of rape and thus the convictions for both rape and false imprisonment violated the protections against double jeopardy; 4) the trial court erroneously imposed consecutive life terms; 5) the life term imposed for the kidnapping conviction should be vacated because the trial court used the kidnapping to impose a life term for the rape conviction. The Court of Appeal corrected the abstract of judgment to reflect that the sentence imposed on the kidnapping with the intent to commit rape conviction was stayed but otherwise affirmed Snowden's conviction in a reasoned, unpublished decision. Snowden, 2009 WL 3165445, at *7. Snowden then petitioned for review in the California Supreme Court, raising his claims that he did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial, the evidence was insufficient to support the false imprisonment conviction, and that his rape and false imprisonment convictions violated double jeopardy. The state supreme court summarily denied the petition on December 17, 2009.
Snowden filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court on January 19, 2010. Snowden v. Adams, No. 10-cv-00651-KJM-GGH, Docket No. 1 at 12. On June 15, 2010, Respondent moved to dismiss Snowden's petition on the ground that one of the four claims asserted in the petition had not been presented to the California Supreme Court and was thus unexhausted. Id. at Docket No. 14.
On February 7, 2011, while Respondent's motion to dismiss was pending, Snowden filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state superior court, in which he claimed: 1) the court struck a ten-year enhancement but sentenced him to it anyway; 2) his assault with a deadly weapon conviction should be reduced to the lesser offense of simple batter; 3) immunity was improperly granted for C.R.; and 4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. On March 29, 2011, the superior court denied the petition in a reasoned opinion.
On March 31, 2011, this Court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss in Snowden v. Adams, No. 10-cv-00651-KJM-GGH, and dismissed the case without prejudice. Snowden v. Adams, No. 10-cv-00651-KJM-GGH, Docket No. 24.
Snowden timely filed the instant Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court on April 5, 2011.
On May 2, 2011, Snowden filed an additional petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state appellate court, raising the same claims he raised in his February 7, 2011, petition to the state superior court. The Court of Appeal denied the petition without comment on May 12, 2011.
In his pro se Petition, Snowden asserts three grounds for relief. First, Snowden argues that his jury trial waiver was invalid because it was not knowingly made and was "based on a promise of benefit." He next contends that the false imprisonment conviction must be reversed as a lesser included offense of forcible rape. Finally, Snowden claims that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his false imprisonment conviction.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). A state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts controlling Supreme Court authority or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision" of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000).
The Supreme Court has explained that "clearly established Federal law" in § 2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. The holding must also be intended to be binding upon the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002). Where holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, "it cannot be said that the state court `unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.'" Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (citation omitted).
To the extent that the petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) (holding that it is of no federal concern whether state law was correctly applied). It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot reexamine a state court's interpretation and application of state law); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (presuming that the state court knew and correctly applied state law), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
In applying these standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the "last reasoned decision" by the state court. See Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)). Under the AEDPA, the state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
Claim One: Invalid Jury Trial Waiver
Snowden first argues that his waiver "was not knowingly made" and "invalid because it was based on a promise of benefit." Snowden asserts that "any inducement offered by the trial court to a defendant to persuade him to waive his fundamental right to a jury trial violates [the] defendant's right to due process of law. Even when there's no outward negotiation, offers of benefit in exchange for a waiver creates substantial danger of unintentional coercion."
When Snowden waived his right to a jury trial, the court and the parties were having the following discussion about motions in limine:
On direct appeal, Snowden argued that his wavier was not knowingly made because he "was confused about the nature and consequences of the jury waiver." He additionally argued that the waiver was based on a promise of benefit because "[t]he trial court intimated that its ruling on the in limine motions would be more favorable to [Snowden] if he waived jury." The appellate court rejected these contentions. It first found that Snowden "clearly and unequivocally expressed his desire to waive his right to a jury and trial counsel agreed with his decision" which established that Snowden's waiver was knowing. Snowden, 2009 WL 3165445, at *4. It further concluded:
The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . an impartial jury of the State and district where in the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. But a criminal defendant may waive his right to trial by jury so long as the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938). Such a waiver occurs where the defendant understands the significance of the decision and makes the decision free from coercion. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993); Adams v. Peterson, 968 F.2d 835, 837 n.1, 843-44 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
Snowden's claim that his waiver was not knowingly made is belied by the record. The record indicates that both defense counsel and the court explained the consequences of a waiver to Snowden and that Snowden voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. "Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) (citing Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495-96 (1962)). Snowden's claim that his waiver was improperly induced by the trial court is also contradicted by the record, which, as the appellate court found, reflects that the trial court's statements "were no more than commonsense observations that a jury trial waiver would simplify some of its rulings on the pending motions." Snowden, 2009 WL 3165445, at *4. The state court's determination neither contravened or unreasonably applied federal law. Accordingly, Snowden is not entitled to relief on his jury waiver claim.
Claim Two: Double Jeopardy Violation
Snowden next contends that his convictions for both false imprisonment and forcible rape violate the protection against double jeopardy. According to Snowden, false imprisonment is a lesser included offense of forcible rape.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offen[s]e to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The clause is enforced against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969). The Supreme Court has previously held that this clause protects against successive prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal or conviction and against multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1998) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
"[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not . . . ." Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977) (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). "If each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes." Brown, 432 U.S. at 166 (quoting Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17 (1975)). As the Court of Appeal concluded on direct review of Snowden's conviction:
Snowden, 2009 WL 3165445, at *5.
Thus, the two convictions do not violate the "same elements" test of Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, and Snowden is not entitled to relief on this ground either.
Claim Three: Insufficiency of the Evidence
Finally, Snowden claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for false imprisonment. In support of this claim, Snowden alleges that the victim "got into [his] car voluntarily and accompanied [him] to a secluded area after she agreed to have sex with [him] for $30.00[.] During the drive she performed oral sex on [him], voluntarily. [She] was never unlawfully restrained, confined or detained[] against her will."
As articulated by the Supreme Court in Jackson, the constitutional standard for sufficiency of the evidence is whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in the original); see McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2010) (reaffirming this standard). This Court must therefore determine whether the California court unreasonably applied Jackson. In making this determination, this Court may not usurp the role of the finder of fact by considering how it would have resolved any conflicts in the evidence, made the inferences, or considered the evidence at trial. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19. Rather, when "faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences," this Court "must presume-even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record-that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and defer to that resolution." Id. at 326.
It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982). Consequently, although the sufficiency of the evidence review by this Court is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, it must take its inquiry by reference to the elements of the crime as set forth in state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16. A fundamental principle of our federal system is "that a state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus." Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); see West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940) ("[T]he highest court of the state is the final arbiter of what is state law. When it has spoken, its pronouncement is to be accepted by federal courts as defining state law. . . ."). "Federal courts hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension." Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 345 (2006) (quoting Smith v. Philips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is through this lens that this Court must view an insufficiency of the evidence claim.
In this case, Snowden's arguments with regard to his legally insufficiency of the evidence claim are nothing more than an attack on the testimony of the victim. But this Court is precluded from either re-weighing the evidence or assessing the credibility of witnesses. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330 (1995); Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957-58 (9th Cir. 2004). Under Jackson, this Court's role is simply to determine whether there is any evidence, if accepted as credible by the trier of fact, sufficient to sustain conviction. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 330. In this case, the victim testified that she got into Snowden's car voluntarily after agreeing to engage in an act of prostitution. She also testified that, after she refused to have sex with him without a condom, Snowden became angry and violent, pointed a revolver at her, and demanded that she have sex with him. She further testified that, after he raped her, Snowden started driving away with the victim. The court found that "her testimony was credible about being kept in that car against her will [and] [a]lso credible about being moved from one place to another."
Contrary to Snowden's assertion, the fact that the court's credibility assessments were not in his favor does not amount to a constitutional violation. Although it might have been possible to draw a different inference from the evidence, this Court is required to resolve that conflict in favor of the prosecution. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Snowden bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that these factual findings were erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). He has failed to carry such burden. The record does not compel the conclusion that no rational trier of fact could have found proof that Snowden was guilty of false imprisonment, especially considering the double deference owed under Jackson and AEDPA. Snowden is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim.
Snowden is not entitled to relief on any ground raised in his Petition.
The Clerk of the Court is to enter judgment accordingly.
