STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant HEATHER MOSES, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 26, 2014, at 9:30 a.m.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 14, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between June 26, 2014, and August 14, 2014, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has produced approximately 2,500 pages of discovery to the defense.

b. Defense counsel desires additional time to review the document discovery, consult with his client regarding the discovery, conduct investigation, and to discuss potential resolution with his client and the government.

c. The parties have been involved in negotiations which have been fruitful and the parties desire additional time to conclude those negotiations.

d. Counsel for each defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny defendants the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e. The government does not object to the continuance.

f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 26, 2014, to August 14, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.