Filed: Jun. 24, 2014
Latest Update: Jun. 24, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Deshawn Ray and Tiffany Tung by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for June 19, 2014. The Court vacated the June 19, 2014, date and set a status hearing for June 20, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, t
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Deshawn Ray and Tiffany Tung by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for June 19, 2014. The Court vacated the June 19, 2014, date and set a status hearing for June 20, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, th..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Deshawn Ray and Tiffany Tung by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for June 19, 2014. The Court vacated the June 19, 2014, date and set a status hearing for June 20, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the case to July 10, 2014, and to exclude time between June 19, 2014, and July 10, 2014, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government and defendant Tung have likely reached an agreement to resolve the case without a trial, and the government will be filing superseding charges against defendant Tung pursuant to that agreement. In addition, defense counsel for defendant Ray has an obligation out of town on Friday, June 20, 2014.
b. The government does not object to the continuance.
c. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 20, 2014, to July 10, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) and Local Code T4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
e. The defendants are aware of and consent to the continuance.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
