GARY S. AUSTIN, Magistrate Judge.
Kelvin X. Singleton ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on January 18, 2008. (Doc. 1.)
On March 27, 2012, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this action and closed this case. (Docs. 198, 199.) On April 30, 2012, Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (Doc. 200.)
On June 6, 2014, the Ninth Circuit issued an order affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's grant of summary judgment, remanding the case to the district court. (Doc. 208.) The Ninth Circuit also remanded Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of an expert witness, for the district court "to consider in the first instance whether Federal Rule of Evidence 706 supports the appointment of an expert in this case." (
This case is now reopened at the district court and proceeds with Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint filed on February 12, 2009, against defendants Chief Medical Officer (CMO) A. Youssef; S. Lopez, M.D.; J. Akanno, M.D.; S. Qamar, M.D.; Dr. Vasquez, M.D.; Registered Nurse II (RN) Ali; and RN Wright-Pearson, on Plaintiff's claims for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, for delay in providing effective treatment for Plaintiff's back pain, and failure to respond to Plaintiff's eye pain and swelling. (Doc. 26.)
In compliance with the Ninth Circuit's order of June 6, 2014, the court now reconsiders and amends its March 14, 2011 order which denied Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of an expert witness. (Doc. 111.)
On November 19, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion for the appointment of an expert witness. (Doc. 111.) On December 6, 2010, Defendants filed an opposition to the motion. (Doc. 115.) On December 27, 2010 and March 7, 2011, Plaintiff filed replies to Defendants' opposition. (Docs. 128, 152.) On March 14, 2011, the court issued an order denying Plaintiff's motion, based on the "in forma pauperis statute[, which] does not authorize the expenditure of public funds for the purpose sought by Plaintiff." (Doc. 154.)
Upon reconsideration of the parties' arguments and in consideration of whether Federal Rule of Evidence 706 supports the appointment of an expert in this case, the court now amends its order.
The court has the discretion to appoint an expert pursuant to Rule 706(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In relevant part, Rule 706 states that "[o]n a party's motion or on its own, the court may order the parties to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed . .." Fed. R. Evid. 706(a);
Plaintiff requests the appointment of an expert witness to determine whether glaucoma or some other medical condition caused partial blindness in his eye. While Plaintiff argues that he is not seeking an expert witness for his personal benefit, but only to assist the court in its ruling, it is nonetheless apparent that Plaintiff seeks the appointment of an expert for the purpose of submitting a competing expert opinion so as to create a triable issue of fact. (Doc. 111, Declaration of Kelvin X. Singleton, at 4 ¶3; Doc. 152, Supplemental Declaration, at 2:11-13.) That is not the function of a neutral expert witness, and the Ninth Circuit has now determined that triable issues of fact exist, precluding summary judgment. While the court is cognizant of the challenges an IFP litigant such as Plaintiff faces in retaining an expert witness, the IFP statute does not grant the court the authority to appoint expert witnesses on behalf of a party. 28 U.S.C. § 1915;
With respect to Plaintiff's eye treatment, the issue in this case is whether Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs when they delayed treatment for his eye pain and swelling, not about his diagnosis. Plaintiff argues that "[w]hether glaucoma or some other medical condition caused the blindness, defendants were deliberately indifferent to [my] serious medical needs," (Doc. 111 at 2), and acknowledges that "[t]his case is not about my glaucoma, but regards the defendants delaying in the medical treatment when I complained of eye pain in which I suddenly los[t] vision in my left eye," (Doc. 111 at 5 ¶6.). While Plaintiff may be correct that the diagnoses of eye diseases can be complex, Plaintiff's allegations relating to pain and treatment are no more complex than those found in a majority of deliberate indifferent cases pending before this court.
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of an expert witness, filed on November 19, 2010, is DENIED.