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U.S. v. DUGAL, 1:14 CR 00075 LJO-BAM. (2014)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20140721639 Visitors: 20
Filed: Jul. 17, 2014
Latest Update: Jul. 17, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER BARBARA A. McAULIFFE, Magistrate Judge. STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, the above-captioned matter was set for a status conference before U.S. Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on Monday, July 28, 2014, at 1:00 p.m. 2. By this stipulation, the
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

BARBARA A. McAULIFFE, Magistrate Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, the above-captioned matter was set for a status conference before U.S. Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on Monday, July 28, 2014, at 1:00 p.m.

2. By this stipulation, the parties now jointly move to vacate the July 28, 2014 status conference, set the matter for status conference on Monday, September 22, 2014, at 1:00 p.m., and exclude time between July 28, 2014 and September 22, 2014

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. On July 14, 2014, as part of its continuing compliance with Rule 16 discovery requirements, the government sent defense counsel a disc containing a large amount of information, including numerous computer forensic examination reports.

b. Counsel for defendant needs sufficient time to review this material and potentially consult with computer experts, and believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny his client effective preparation of counsel taking in to account the exercise of due diligence.

c. The defendant is not in custody and does not object to the continuance.

d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 28, 2014 to September 22, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at joint request of the parties on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED that the 1st Status Conference is continued from July 28, 2014 to September 22, 2014 at 1:00 PM before Judge McAuliffe. Time is excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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