STIPULATION TO VACATE TRIAL DATE AND SET CHANGE OF PLEA HEARINGS; FINDINGS AND ORDER

ANTHONY W. ISHII, District Judge.

STIPULATION

The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for trial on September 9, 2014 at 8:30 a.m.

2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to vacate the trial date and set the matter for change of plea as to both defendants for August 11, 2014 at 10:00 a.m. before Judge Ishii, and to exclude time between the date of this stipulation and August 11, 2014 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv).

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. Both defendants have executed plea agreements with the government, which have been filed with the Court.

b. Defendant Bonnie Lynn Recinos would be travelling from Arizona to California for the change of plea hearing, and has requested August 11, 2014 as the first convenient date for travelling to California for a change of plea hearing. An August 11, 2014 change of plea hearing is also convenient for defendant Obdulia Julie Leon.

c. As neither of the defendants intends on going to trial, the parties request that the trial date, and all other corresponding Court dates be vacated.

d. By previous Court order, Dkt. No. 38, time was excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., through and including September 9, 2014 for inter alia continued investigation and trial preparation. In an abundance of caution, the parties also request that time be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., from the date of this stipulation through and including August 11, 2014, to allow the defendants to continue to consult with counsel regarding their change of plea, and to prepare for and attend their change of plea hearings.

e. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance/time exclusion would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

f. The government does not object to the continuance/time exclusion.

g. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

h. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to August 11, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED . For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to August 11, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. At the request of the parties, the September 9, 2014 trial date and all other corresponding Court dates in the above case are VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.