STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE; FINDINGS AND ORDER

SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge.

STIPULATION

The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 4, 2014 at 1:00 p.m.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until September 29, 2014 at 1:00 p.m. before Judge Oberto, and to exclude time between the date of this stipulation and September 29, 2014 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv). The government does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes over 2,700 pages of discovery, including investigative reports and related documents. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b. Counsel for defendant Rosaura Tinajero desires additional time in preparation of this case. Defense counsel needs additional time to conduct investigation, review voluminous discovery and have further settlement negotiations with the government. The government will shortly forward to defendant Tinajero a plea offer for consideration. Defendant Tinajero, who is out of custody, also travels from Nebraska to California to attend Court hearings. September 29, 2014 is a convenient date for Tinajero to travel and appear in person in Court. Thus, the requested continuance will conserve time and resources for the parties and the court.

c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to September 29, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

O R D E R

IT IS SO ORDERED.