BARBARA A. McAULIFFE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Anthony Johnson ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on Plaintiff's complaint, filed on July 21, 2009, against Defendants L. Gonzales
Following remand from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on November 15, 2013.
On June 11, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to file an amended opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 108.)
On June 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment. He also filed a notice and motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 109, 110.) The Court construes Plaintiff's papers as an opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Defendants did not file a reply and the motion is deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment must be entered, "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.
In arriving at this order, the Court carefully reviewed and considered all arguments, points and authorities, declarations, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto, if any, objections, and other papers filed by the parties. Omission of reference to an argument, document, paper, or objection is not to be construed to the effect that this Court did not consider the argument, document, paper, or objection. This Court thoroughly reviewed and considered the evidence it deemed admissible, material, and appropriate.
On June 9, 2008, Defendants Gonzales and Murrieta were escorting Plaintiff back to his cell from the law library. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 7, 13.) Defendants were trying to engage Plaintiff in conversation, making threats, and using profanity. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 13.) Defendant Gonzales began pulling on Plaintiff's left arm, telling him to speed up and walk faster. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 15, 16.) Plaintiff's hands were handcuffed behind his back and he was holding his legal mail. Plaintiff responded that he could not go any faster and that he was losing his grip on the envelope he was holding because Defendant Gonzales was pulling on his arm. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 15.) Defendant Gonzales slammed Plaintiff to the ground with enough force that "Plaintiffs head was busted." (ECF No. 1, ¶ 17.) Plaintiff was struck by Defendants Gonzales and Murrieta numerous times before losing consciousness. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 18.) When Plaintiff regained consciousness, Correctional Officers Beltran and Blevins escorted him to the medical clinic for treatment. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 20.)
1. Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR").
2. Plaintiff was housed at California State Prison, Corcoran ("CSP-Corcoran") in the Security Housing Unit ("SHU") at the time of the events at issue.
3. In June 2008, Defendants Gonzales and Murrieta worked as search and escort officers in CSP-Corcoran's SHU. 4. Search and escort officers escorted inmates housed in the SHU to and from their cells.
5. Escorts were generally performed by two officers.
6. The standard procedure, under such circumstances, was for one officer to walk on either side of the inmate.
7. The practice was for the officers to stay within arms-length of the inmate, with at least one officer keeping his hands on the inmate's arms at all times.
8. During the escort, the inmate was required to remain facing forward.
9. From that position, the inmate posed the least risk of harm to the escorting officers.
10. These security measures were necessary because the SHU was used to house inmates whose conduct in prison had been found to endanger the safety of others or the security of the institution.
11. On June 9, 2008, Defendants Gonzales and Murrieta were escorting Plaintiff back to his housing unit from the law library.
12. Defendant Gonzales was positioned on Plaintiff's left and Defendant Murrieta was positioned on his right.
13. Plaintiff's hands were cuffed behind his back.
14. Defendant Gonzales was holding Plaintiff's left forearm with his right hand.
15. During the escort, Plaintiff turned his head and shoulder toward Defendant Murrieta and said, in an apparent reference to Defendant Gonzales, "Hey cuz, he keeps grabbing my arm" and "You're going to have to take me down."
16. In response, Defendant Gonzales ordered Plaintiff to face forward and not to turn his shoulder.
17. Plaintiff turned towards Defendant Gonzales, twisting his upper body as if he was trying to break the grip Defendant Gonzales had on his left forearm.
18. Plaintiff then stepped up to Defendant Gonzales and hit Defendant Gonzales' chest with his own chest.
19. As Plaintiff was moving towards him, Officer Gonzales turned to his left and tried to use Plaintiff's momentum to put him on the ground.
20. As he did so, Defendant Gonzales slipped on the gravel underneath, and the two men went down to the ground.
21. Once Plaintiff and Defendant Gonzales were on the ground, Plaintiff continued to resist by jerking his upper body and kicking his legs.
22. Plaintiff was face down at the time.
23. Defendant Gonzales kept control of Plaintiff's upper body by placing his left hand on Plaintiff's left shoulder, and his right hand on Plaintiff's back, until responding staff arrived.
24. For his part, Murrieta tried to maintain control of Plaintiff's lower body by placing his knee on the back of Plaintiff's legs.
25. Once responding staff arrived, they took over for Defendants Gonzales and Murrieta.
26. After being relieved, Defendant Gonzales went to the medical clinic and was seen for scrapes on his left wrist, fingers, and arm, and also on his right arm.
27. After the incident, Plaintiff was seen by medical staff and found to have abrasions/scratches on his right forehead, right cheek, and on the front of both knees.
28. Medical staff cleared Plaintiff to go back to his building.
29. Based on the events of June 9, 2008, Plaintiff was charged with "Battery on a Peace Officer and issued a Rules Violation Report.
30. At the disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty of the charge.
31. Plaintiff also was assessed 150 days' loss of good time credits.
32. The hearing officer's guilty finding was based, in part, on: (1) Defendant Gonzales' written report documenting that after Defendant Gonzales ordered Plaintiff to face forward and not to turn his shoulder, Plaintiff stepped towards Defendant Gonzales and hit Gonzales' chest with his chest; and (2) the investigative report prepared by Correctional Officer Heatherly, which also documented that Plaintiff turned towards Defendant Gonzales and bumped Defendant Gonzales with his chest.
Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff's claim, insofar as it involves the initial takedown, is barred by the favorable termination rule, also known as the Heck bar, because Plaintiff lost time credits as a result of being found guilty in prison disciplinary proceedings;
As a general matter, state prisoners may not challenge the fact or duration of their confinement in a section 1983 action and their sole remedy lies in habeas corpus relief.
The evidence submitted by Defendants demonstrates that Plaintiff forfeited 150 days in time credits as a result of being found guilty in prison disciplinary proceedings of battery on a peace officer. (ECF No. 99-5, Defs' Ex. B, p. 7.) Plaintiff admits that he was found guilty and assessed 150 days loss of good time credits. (ECF No. 109, Pl's Statement ¶9.)
Although Plaintiff does not dispute the credit loss, he argues that the Heck bar does not apply because he has not been convicted of battery in a court of law. (ECF No. 109, p. 10.) This argument is unavailing and does not create a factual dispute regarding the disposition imposed following his prison disciplinary hearing. Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the favorable termination rule applies to prison disciplinary proceedings if those proceedings resulted in the loss of good-time or behavior credits.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants' arguments are irrelevant because he is not seeking to restore a loss of good time credits and that Heck does not apply to the alleged assault "once Plaintiff was slamed [sic] on the ground." (ECF No. 109., P. 8.) Plaintiff fails to recognize that Defendants seek to apply the Heck bar solely to the initial takedown by Defendant Gonzales, not the alleged assault. Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary lack merit.
Therefore, Plaintiff's excessive force claim regarding the initial takedown is barred by the favorable termination rule if a finding in his favor on his claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the resulting disciplinary conviction.
As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Gonzales and Murrieta were escorting him back to his cell from the law library. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 7, 13.) Defendant Gonzales began pulling on Plaintiff's left arm, telling him to speed up and walk faster. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 15, 16.) Plaintiff's hands were handcuffed behind his back and he was holding his legal mail. When Plaintiff responded that he could not go any faster and that he was losing his grip on an envelope he was holding, Defendant Gonzales slammed Plaintiff to the ground with enough force that "Plaintiffs head was busted." (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 15 17.)
In contrast, in finding Plaintiff guilty of battery on a peace officer, the prison disciplinary hearing officer's findings of fact were based on the preponderance of the following evidence:
5) Investigative Report completed by Correctional Officer R. HEATHERLY. (ECF No. 99-5, Defs' Ex. B.) The investigative report completed by Correctional Officer R. Heatherly also documented that Plaintiff turned towards Gonzales and bumped Gonzales with his chest. (
To prevail on his excessive force claim regarding the initial takedown, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the force at issue was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.
A disciplinary conviction for battery on a peace officer is not necessarily inconsistent with a finding in the inmate's favor on an excessive force claim brought pursuant to section 1983 claim. In other words, an excessive force claim following a disciplinary conviction is not
In Plaintiff's version of events, Defendant Gonzales' takedown was entirely unprovoked. In Defendants' version of events, Plaintiff refused to follow a direct order, Plaintiff turned toward Defendant Gonzales and twisted his upper body as if trying to break Defendant Gonzales' grip, and Plaintiff then stepped towards Defendant Gonzales, hitting Defendant Gonzales' chest with his chest. When Defendant Gonzales attempted to put Plaintiff on the ground, he slipped on the gravel and went down to the ground.
Plaintiff's disciplinary conviction and his excessive force claim regarding the initial takedown arise from the same incident, and the two versions of events are entirely inconsistent with one another. If Plaintiff prevailed on his claim that Defendant Gonzales, unprovoked by Plaintiff and without any justification, used excessive physical force against him and seriously injured him during the initial takedown, his success would necessarily invalidate the result of the disciplinary hearing, which was based on the finding that Plaintiff instigated the entire incident and battered Defendant Gonzales, causing Defendant Gonzales to have to take him to the ground to regain control over him. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff's excessive force claim regarding the initial takedown is barred by the favorable termination rule, and this portion of his claim must be dismissed.
Plaintiff alleges that after the initial takedown, he was struck by Defendants Gonzales and Murrieta numerous times before losing consciousness. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 18.) When Plaintiff regained consciousness, Correctional Officers Beltran and Blevins escorted him to the medical clinic for treatment. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 20.)
Defendants argue that the quality and quantity of the evidence would not allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for Plaintiff relating to the alleged assault. In particular, Defendants assert that the undisputed medical evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff sustained only minor injuries consistent with the initial takedown, but entirely incompatible with Plaintiff's account of an assault causing him to lose consciousness. (ECF No. 99-1, p. 8, Defs' Stmt. 20, 27-28; ECF No. 99-5, Defs' Ex. E.)
However, in excessive force cases, the "core judicial inquiry" is "not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm."
In judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence.
As a final matter, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. In light of the findings above, the Court addresses this argument only with respect to that portion of the excessive force claim that survives summary judgment.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
In resolving a claim of qualified immunity, courts must determine whether, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right, and if so, whether the right was clearly established.
Having determined that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a constitutional violation, the Court must determine whether the right was clearly established. "For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours `must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'"
By 2008, the prohibition against the use of excessive physical force was clearly established.
For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment, filed on November 15, 2013, be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
