STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT AND CONSOLIDATION OF CASES FOR TRIAL; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

KIMBERLY J. MUELLER, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. On August 13, 2014, the parties appeared before the Court for a status conference in relation to both of the above-referenced matters. At the hearing, attorney Gary Decker appeared with the defendant on behalf defendant's counsel George Mgdesyan.

2. At the status conference, and at the request of the parties, the court set a jury trial date of February 2, 2015, and a trial confirmation hearing date of December 17, 2014.

3. At the hearing, the United States confirmed that consolidation of the related cases for trial would be appropriate. Attorney Decker was not authorized to state the defendant's position on this issue. In addition, the Court excluded time between August 13, 2014, and the trial start of trial on February 2, 2015, under local code T4. The Court requested that the parties confirm that counsel for defendant agreed this exclusion is appropriate.

4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The two related criminal cases pending against the defendant in this district are appropriate for consolidation for trial.

b) A further exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act is appropriate.

c) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review the current charges and the discovery, to consult with the defendant, and to consider possible resolution of this matter.

d) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time between August 13, 2014, and February 2, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.