Filed: Sep. 24, 2014
Latest Update: Sep. 24, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. STIPULATION Defendant Jacquline Hoegel, by and through defendant's counsel of record, and plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 30, 2014. 2. Due to a personal scheduling conflict that has developed regarding Ms. Hoegel's below counsel, he has
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. STIPULATION Defendant Jacquline Hoegel, by and through defendant's counsel of record, and plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 30, 2014. 2. Due to a personal scheduling conflict that has developed regarding Ms. Hoegel's below counsel, he has r..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Defendant Jacquline Hoegel, by and through defendant's counsel of record, and plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 30, 2014.
2. Due to a personal scheduling conflict that has developed regarding Ms. Hoegel's below counsel, he has requested — and government counsel has agreed to — this stipulation to continue the status conference to October 14, 2014.
3. By this stipulation, the parties stipulate and agree that the status conference should be continued to October 14, 2014 and that the time between September 30, 2014 and October 14, 2014 should be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act.
4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has produced voluminous discovery. b) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. c) The government agrees to the continuance. d) Based on the above stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 30, 2014 to October 14, 2014, inclusive is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv)[Local Code T4] because it Results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
September 24, 2014. BENJAMIN KINGSLEY
Assistant United States Attorney
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
