JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
The defendant, JOSEPH DAROSA, by and through his undersigned counsel and the United States by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby agree and request that the status conference currently set for Tuesday, September 30, 2014 at 9:30 am be vacated and continued to Tuesday, January 27, 2015 at 9:30 am.
A continuance is necessary due to a backlog caused by defense counsel having to continue a numbers of matters. Counsel needs additional time to investigate and evaluate the case. Further, counsel is involved in an ongoing preliminary hearing in Sacramento Superior Court that began Friday, September 26, 2014 and will likely continue through the remainder of today and into tomorrow, Tuesday, September 30, 2014.
Defendant is out of custody on a property bond posted by his family and is in agreement with this continuance.
The parties further stipulate that the failure to grant a continuance in this matter would deny counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence; that the ends of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial; and that time should be excluded from the computation of time within which trial must commence under the Speedy Trial Act from September 30, 2014, up to and including January 27, 2015, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T-4, to allow defense counsel reasonable time to prepare.
I, William E. Bonham, the filing party, have received authorization from AUSA Jill Thomas to sign and submit this stipulation and proposed order on her behalf.
Accordingly, the defense and the United States agree and stipulate that the status conference for defendant Joseph DaRosa should be continued until Tuesday, January 27, 2015 at 9:30 am.
IT IS SO ORDERED. The status conference currently set for Tuesday, September 30, 2014 at 9:30 am is vacated and continued to Tuesday, January 27, 2015, at 9:30 am.
I find that the failure to grant such a continuance would deny counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. Accordingly, the time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act is excluded from September 30, 2014, up to and including the date of the new status conference, January 27, 2015, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T4. I specifically find that the ends of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendants in a speedy trial within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T-4.