Filed: Oct. 01, 2014
Latest Update: Oct. 01, 2014
Summary: ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge. On July 24, 2014, Plaintiff Scott Johnson ("Plaintiff") filed the instant action against defendants Giovanni Holdings ("Defendant") and Charleanne Cannon ("Cannon"). ECF No. 1. On August 7, 2014, a Summons as to Defendant was returned as executed on August 1, 2014. ECF No. 4. Because Defendant failed to timely respond to the Complaint, Plaintiff requested, and the Clerk of the Court issued, an Entry of Default on September 8, 2014. See ECF Nos.
Summary: ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge. On July 24, 2014, Plaintiff Scott Johnson ("Plaintiff") filed the instant action against defendants Giovanni Holdings ("Defendant") and Charleanne Cannon ("Cannon"). ECF No. 1. On August 7, 2014, a Summons as to Defendant was returned as executed on August 1, 2014. ECF No. 4. Because Defendant failed to timely respond to the Complaint, Plaintiff requested, and the Clerk of the Court issued, an Entry of Default on September 8, 2014. See ECF Nos. ..
More
ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge.
On July 24, 2014, Plaintiff Scott Johnson ("Plaintiff") filed the instant action against defendants Giovanni Holdings ("Defendant") and Charleanne Cannon ("Cannon"). ECF No. 1. On August 7, 2014, a Summons as to Defendant was returned as executed on August 1, 2014. ECF No. 4. Because Defendant failed to timely respond to the Complaint, Plaintiff requested, and the Clerk of the Court issued, an Entry of Default on September 8, 2014. See ECF Nos. 6-7. On September 18, 2014, Defendant filed an untimely Answer. Now, through a joint stipulation, the parties seek to set aside the entry of default as to Defendant.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c)1 provides that "[f]or good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)." The Ninth Circuit has indicated that a district court's discretion is "especially broad where . . . it is entry of default that is being set aside, rather than a default judgment." Mendoza v. Wight Vineyard Mgmt., 783 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citation omitted); see also Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 2000). The defaulting party bears the burden of establishing "good cause" to set aside an entry of default. Franchise Holding II, LLC v. Huntington Rests. Group, Inc., 375 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). In determining whether there is good cause to set aside entry of default, the court considers: (1) whether the defaulting party engaged in culpable conduct which led to the default; (2) whether the defaulting party lacks a meritorious defense; and (3) whether setting aside the default would prejudice the party who obtained it. Mendoza, 783 F.2d at 946. These factors are disjunctive; therefore, the court may deny a Rule 55(c) motion if it finds present any one of the foregoing factors. Franchise Holding, 375 F.2d at 926 (internal citation omitted). However, where timely relief is sought from a default and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the default so that cases may be decided on their merits. Mendoza, 783 F.2d at 946. The moving party need not file a noticed motion to set aside the entry of default; however, it must set forth sufficient rationale to demonstrate good cause in a manner permitted by this Court's Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as a stipulation, an ex parte application, or a noticed motion. See Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 385-86 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that Rule 55(c) does not require a motion).
On September 24, 2014, Plaintiff and Defendant submitted a joint stipulation and proposed order which states, in full, as follows: "The parties hereto, by and through their respective attorneys, do hereby Stipulate that the Default of Defendant Giovanni Holdings be set-aside and that any Default Judgment be vacated." ECF No. 11. The parties' stipulation is insufficient as it fails to set forth good cause as required by Rule 55(c). See Mendoza, 783 F.2d at 946. Moreover, where the Clerk has already entered default, a request for relief from the entry of default is not saved by the fact that there is an Answer on file.2 See Stanley v. Heckler, 604 F.Supp. 1102, 1104 (D. Mont. 1985) (explaining that untimely responding to the complaint does not constitute "good cause," even under the relaxed standard of Rule 55(c)); see also Cal. Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2014) §§ 6:42-6:43 (noting that the entry of a defendant's default cuts off his or her right to appear in the action, and, therefore, where a party seeks to file an answer after default has been entered, "[i]t is too late"); 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 3d § 2692 ("Therefore, [the] defendant must request that the default be `excused' and secure leave to answer before a responsive pleading will be recognized.").3 Therefore, given that Defendant bears the burden of establishing good cause to set aside an entry of default, the Court DENIES without prejudice the parties' request to set aside the entry of default as to Defendant Giovanni Holdings (ECF No. 11).
IT IS SO ORDERED.