ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT SACRAMENTO COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
Defendant Sacramento County ("Defendant") moves to dismiss the first cause of action for violation of his civil rights in Plaintiff James Hass' ("Plaintiff") Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.1
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
From February 8, 2011 to March 5, 2011, Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Sacramento County Jail on an order of civil contempt, arising from a family court matter. SAC ¶ 9. Pursuant to California Penal Code ("CPC") § 4001, Defendant County "separated Plaintiff from inmates who were [awaiting] pending trials or serving sentences for criminal convictions." SAC ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges that, "[a]s a proximate result of the de facto policy of discrimination against an inmate serving a civil commitment, Defendant County deprived Plaintiff of a humane environment" during his incarceration. SAC ¶ 24. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was kept in a windowless cell along with "large bags of kitchen garbage," and was not provided time to exercise, shower, or "watch the news." SAC ¶¶ 15, 20.
Plaintiff also alleges that, on his first day in custody, he "went through the routine intake processing" at the jail, which included a medical interview. SAC ¶¶ 28-29. During this interview, Plaintiff disclosed a number of medical conditions including hypertension, acute sleep apnea, diabetes, and a history of strokes. SAC ¶ 30. Plaintiff was originally provided with blood pressure medication but, at some point during his incarceration, "Defendant County withdrew all medications from Plaintiff and deprived Plaintiff of access to a [sleep apnea] CPAP machine." SAC ¶ 36. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew or should have known that the failure to provide appropriate medical treatment "created a high risk of harm to Plaintiff." SAC ¶ 41.
Plaintiff was represented by Sean Gjerde ("Defendant Gjerde") in the above-mentioned family court matter. SAC ¶ 4. Defendant Gjerde's representation of Plaintiff is the subject matter of Plaintiff's second through sixth causes of action. However, as Defendant County's Motion to Dismiss only addresses Plaintiff's first cause of action, the facts of Defendant Gjerde's representation are not relevant to its motion and are not summarized here.
II. OPINION
Plaintiff's only claim against the Defendant County alleges a "violation of [his] civil rights." SAC at 3. Although Plaintiff does not expressly invoke a statute, it is inferred that his claim is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and takes the form of a § 1983 Monell claim. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
A municipality can be sued under § 1983, but "it cannot be held liable unless a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional injury." Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993). In order to state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that an official policy or custom existed; (2) that the plaintiff suffered constitutional injury; and (3) the existence of a causal link between the policy/custom and the plaintiff's injury. Id. Each of these elements must also be alleged with "sufficient particularity" and general or conclusory allegations will not suffice. See, e.g., Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (approving the dismissal of a Monell claim, on the grounds that "the complaint did not allege a deliberate County policy with sufficient particularity").
Plaintiff argues, generally, that his civil rights were violated during his confinement in Sacramento County Jail. SAC ¶¶ 9-45. Plaintiff notes that the alleged "inhumane treatment. . . has two component parts." Opp. at 5. First, he alleges that he was deprived of appropriate medical care due to Defendant's failure to adequately train its employees. SAC ¶ 42. Second, he alleges that he was confined under inhumane conditions due to his status as a civil inmate. SAC ¶ 24.
A. Failure to Train Employees to Provide Medical Care
Defendant moves to dismiss the claim against it because Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish municipality liability for failure to adequately train its employees to provide Plaintiff with medical care. Mot. at 4. Defendant notes that both the SAC and Plaintiff's opposition brief "fail[] to explain the medical consequences of the County's alleged failure to provide him with his medications." Reply at 4. Plaintiff does not directly address this issue, but appears to argue that exposure to the risk of harm is sufficient to state a civil rights violation. Opp. at 3-4 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993)).
Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not specifically alleged any harm suffered as a result of Defendant's failure to provide him with adequate medical treatment. SAC ¶ 41. Plaintiff did allege that Defendant's employees failed to provide him access to his CPAP sleep apnea machine, and failed to provide him with his blood pressure medication during his incarceration. SAC ¶ 36. However, Plaintiff merely alleged that "the deprivation of currently prescribed medications and medical equipment to Plaintiff created a high risk of harm to Plaintiff." SAC ¶ 41. Even taking this allegation as true, Plaintiff has not alleged any actual injury that resulted from the risk created by Defendant's employees. His conclusory allegation that that he "suffered injury to his person" is insufficient in this regard. Brooks, 197 F.3d at 1247.
Actual injury — or a continuing risk of harm — is a necessary element of a Monell claim. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166; see also, Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1993) (holding that a prisoner had stated a cause of action for injunctive relief under the Eighth Amendment where he alleged that he was being exposed to a cellmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes per day). Since Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated, he cannot allege that he is currently being exposed to a continuing risk of harm (i.e., Defendant continues to deprive him of his medication). Plaintiff's failure to allege actual injury or a continuing risk of harm is fatal to his Monell claim, insofar as it is based on Defendant's failure to provide Plaintiff with proper medical care. For this reason, the Court does not need to address the parties' arguments as to whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged the remaining elements of his Monell claim for "failure to train" its employees in providing medical treatment, or for "deliberate indifference" to his medical needs. Mot. at 4-7; Opp. at 6-17.
B.Inhumane Treatment due to Classification as Civil Prisoner
Plaintiff has also alleged that he suffered constitutional harm due to the inhumane conditions of his confinement. SAC ¶ 24. Specifically, he claims that he was "not allowed regular exercise time, not allowed regular shower time, not allowed to watch the news," and was held in a windowless cell that was "being used to store large bags of kitchen garbage." SAC ¶¶ 14, 20. Plaintiff alleges that that these deprivations were the "proximate result of the de facto policy of discrimination against an inmate serving a civil commitment." SAC ¶ 24. Plaintiff appears to be referring to California Penal Code § 4001. SAC ¶ 11. CPC § 4001 merely mandates that criminal and civil prisoners be "confined separately and distinctly." Notably, § 4001 does not address the conditions of confinement. Section 4001 is facially unrelated to the conditions of Plaintiff's confinement, and Plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite causal link between the official policy and the harm suffered. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166. His conclusory allegation that the conditions of his confinement were the "proximate result" of the official policy is insufficient. Brooks, 197 F.3d at 1247. Similarly, to the extent that Plaintiff's Monell claim is based on the failure to follow Defendant County's statement of "Mission and Goals," the causal link is missing: it cannot be said that an official policy is the "moving force" behind an injury caused by a violation of that policy. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The Court therefore finds that allegedly inhumane conditions of Plaintiff's incarceration cannot form the basis for Plaintiff's Monell claim.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's first cause of action is insufficient to state a Monell claim. Neither of the "two component parts" of Plaintiff's alleged mistreatment is sufficient grounds for his § 1983 action against Defendant County. Opp. at 5. Plaintiff's remaining arguments are foreclosed by Plaintiff's failure to allege any actual harm resulting from the deprivation of medical treatment, and by Plaintiff's failure to allege a causal nexus between an official policy and the conditions of his confinement.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's first cause of action is GRANTED. As amendment of the complaint would not necessarily be futile, the motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).
III. ORDER
The Court GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Defendant County's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's first cause of action. Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint must be filed within twenty days from the date of this Order. Defendant's responsive pleading is due within twenty days thereafter. If Plaintiff elects not to file a Third Amended Complaint, the case will proceed without Defendant County.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
