MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 30, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to set this matter for a change of plea hearing on November 20, 2014, and to exclude time between October 30, 2014, and November 20, 2014, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes reports and documents which number approximately 430 pages. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) The United States has provided a plea agreement to counsel for the defendant.
c) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to conduct investigation and research with respect to the plea agreement, to review discovery with respect to the factual basis in the plea agreement, and to research potential resolution.
d) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e) The United States does not object to the continuance.
f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 30, 2014 to November 20, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.