Filed: Nov. 05, 2014
Latest Update: Nov. 05, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 6, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until November 13, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between November 6, 2014, and November 13, 2014, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 6, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until November 13, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between November 6, 2014, and November 13, 2014, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 6, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until November 13, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between November 6, 2014, and November 13, 2014, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and other documents in electronic form. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review discovery for this matter, to engage in discussions with the United States regarding potential resolution, and to otherwise prepare for a possible trial.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) Additionally, new counsel for codefendant, Alejandro Galvan, is unavailable until November 13, 2014. Counsel for the government and counsel for defendant wish to place both defendants on the same calendar date in anticipation of possible trial setting.
e) The government does not object to the continuance.
f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 6, 2014 to November 13, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.