STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 6, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until December 18, 2014, and to exclude time between November 6, 2014, and December 18, 2014, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 1,000 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form. Discovery from additional related cases is now being requested and reviewed which consists of approximately 4,000 pages. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to consult with an immigration expert, have that expert conduct research, meet with the defendant and prepare a report based on the findings in light of the potential disposition recently conveyed to counsel. After the immigration analysis is completed, counsel will need time to discuss the findings and potential consequences with the defendant. Since the parties have begun discussions as to a possible resolution, the parties agree to set dates at the next hearing for trial if resolution does not succeed.

c. Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 6, 2014, to December 18, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.