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U.S. v. Willis, 2:13-CR-00228-MCE. (2014)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20141112924 Visitors: 18
Filed: Nov. 10, 2014
Latest Update: Nov. 10, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge. It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto, through their respective counsel, as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 6, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until December 11, 2014, and to exclude time between November 6, 2014, and December 11, 2014, under
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto, through their respective counsel, as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 6, 2014. 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until December 11, 2014, and to exclude time between November 6, 2014, and December 11, 2014, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate and request that the Court find the following: a. The Government has represented that discovery associated with this case consists of material Bates numbered 001 through 6719. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel for the defendant. b. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to review and assess recent information received from the Government relevant to Guideline calculations and to review and discuss the Government's proposed plea offer with the defendant. Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. c. The Government does not object to the continuance. d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 6, 2014, to December 11, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) (Local Code T4) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney By /s/ Candace A. Fry for TODD A. PICKLES, Assistant United States Attorney

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Source:  Leagle
Lawyers who claimed
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Citations
2:13-CR-00228-MCE.
Counsels
  • CANDACE A. FRY
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