ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

The Court has received, read and considered the parties' supplemental briefings on Defendant Rabobank's ("Defendant") motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Jasbir Lally's ("Plaintiff") third and fourth causes of action for failure to take steps to accommodate her disability in the workplace. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Lally worked for Defendant Rabobank for over five years without incident. See Lally Decl. ¶ 2. As an "Administrative Vice President," Plaintiff supported the CEO in administrative tasks and supervised other administrative assistants. Lally Depo. at 21:9-18.

Things changed when Plaintiff came under the direction of a new CEO, John Ryan, in October 2012. See Ryan Decl. ¶¶ 2-3; Lally Depo. at 22:22-23:1. Around that time, she started suffering from symptoms of stress, sleeplessness, and anxiety. Lally Depo. at 42:14-19 & 45:10-19. Plaintiff sought help from a medical professional, who diagnosed her with an anxiety disorder. Lally Depo. at 32:9-13. Thereafter, Plaintiff began taking medication, took several sick days, and embarked on a three-week vacation concluding January 8, 2013. Lally Depo. at 74:1-3, 119:12-13, 123:5-9, 127:4-128:4 & 134:1-4.

While on vacation, Plaintiff took action in hopes of bettering her work situation. She filed a workers' compensation claim against Defendant, citing her "Mental Stress." Stangeland Suppl. Decl. ¶ 6; id. Exh. B. She had her medical provider send Defendant the first of numerous "Work Status/Progress Reports" detailing Plaintiff's health limitations and activities she could and could not engage in. Stangeland Suppl. Decl. ¶ 6; id. Exhs. E, G & I. Finally, she filed a "Leave of Absence Request Form" on the basis of "[a] serious health condition" that was "[w]ork [r]elated." Stangeland Suppl. Decl. Exh. C. She requested her leave to begin on January 14 and did not specify a "return to work date." See id. Defendant granted this leave through "a date to be determined." See Stangeland Suppl. Decl. Exh. D.

After her vacation, Plaintiff returned to work for a single day on January 10. Stangeland Suppl. Decl. ¶ 13; id. Exh. A. Thereafter she remained on leave until Defendant terminated her in early February for exporting confidential documents to her personal email. Stangeland Suppl. Decl. ¶ 9; id. Exh. A; Weiss Decl. ¶ 5.

Plaintiff filed her complaint in this action on January 22, 2013 (Doc. #1) alleging nine causes of action: (1) Termination (or demotion) in violation of public policy; (2) Disability discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"); (3) Failure to engage in the interactive process towards a reasonable accommodation under FEHA; (4) Failure to provide reasonable accommodation under FEHA; (5) Disability harassment under FEHA; (6) Unlawful retaliation under FEHA; (7) Intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) National origin discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"); and (9) Color discrimination under Title VII. Defendant lodged a counterclaim (Doc. #6) seeking damages for Plaintiff's alleged transmission of confidential bank information and injunctive relief to prohibit her use of these documents. See Weiss Decl. ¶ 9.

Defendant brought this motion for summary judgment as to each of Plaintiff's causes of action (Doc. #31). The Court heard oral argument on October 15, 2014 (Doc. #36). At that time, it granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff's claims, except the third and fourth causes of action. The Court also ordered further briefing and factual development on the third and fourth claims. Both parties submitted briefing (Doc. ##37, 39 & 40) and Defendant filed a supplemental statement of material facts (Doc. #37). Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's supplemental statement or to provide any further factual development. Instead, she filed an "ex parte motion to strike all of the defense supplemental briefing beyond the initial ten pages" (Doc. #38).

II. OPINION

A. "Ex Parte motion to strike"

As an initial matter, the Court declines Plaintiff's request that it disregard portions of Defendant's briefing. That briefing complied with this Court's order and with the local rules.

At oral argument, the Court ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing up to ten pages and further factual development. Defendant complied with this order by filing a ten-page brief, as well as other documents comprising the factual basis for that briefing: a "statement of undisputed material facts" and the declarations and exhibits supporting those facts. These additional documents were required in order to comply with the Court's order to engage in further factual development. They were also required to comply with the local rules. See Local Rule 260.

Because Defendant has complied with the Court's order and the local rules, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's "ex parte" motion to strike. The Court has therefore considered all documents submitted in Defendant's supplement briefing.

B. Motion for summary judgment on third and fourth causes of action.

The parties' arguments in their supplemental briefing concerned Plaintiff's third and fourth claims — failure to engage in the interactive process and failure to accommodate.1 The analyses for these issues are interrelated, so the Court considers both below.

The parties first dispute when Defendant was on notice of Plaintiff's disability. Defendant argued in the first round of briefing that "Plaintiff never communicated her need for accommodation" and "never provided Rabobank with any written document from her health care provider . . . ." Mot. at 17:28-18:3; Stangeland Decl. ¶ 9. Upon further factual development, Defendant concedes that it did become aware of Plaintiff's anxiety disorder when she filed a worker's compensation claim on January 2, 2013. Stangeland Suppl. Decl. ¶ 6. Defendant further concedes that throughout the month of January, it received communications from Plaintiff and her medical provider about her need to alleviate stress, as well as multiple "Work Status/Progress Reports" detailing activities that Plaintiff could and could not engage in. Suppl. Brief. at 5; Stangeland Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 6-12.

Plaintiff meanwhile persists in arguing that Defendant was on notice of her disability since October 2012. Opp. at 5; Opp. to Suppl. Brief. at 2 & 3. But this argument is foreclosed by the Court's previous ruling. The Court already addressed the issue of notice in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim. For the reasons then stated, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to establish a triable issue of whether Defendant was on notice before January 2013.

This lack of notice forecloses Defendant's liability as a matter of law. An employer can only be liable for failure to accommodate or engage in the interactive process under FEHA if the employer was on notice of the disability or the need to accommodate. Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, summary judgment in Defendant's favor is warranted to the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to accommodate her or engage in an interactive process between October and January 2.

Even after January 2, Plaintiff has not shown a genuine factual dispute. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to meet its FEHA obligations because it "unilaterally concluded it could not accommodate Ms. Lally and sent her away." Opp. to Suppl. Brief. at 6:11-12. But the undisputed evidence does not support Plaintiff's version of events. Indeed, Plaintiff was only at work for a single day between January 2 and her termination on February 8. Yet the reason for Plaintiff's absence was not that Defendant "sent her away." Rather, Plaintiff herself requested to be absent. First, she scheduled her vacation until January 8. Then, after coming to work for a single day on January 10, she was granted leave after filing her "Leave of Absence Request Form." If Plaintiff was sent away, it was only because she so requested. Plaintiff has not pointed the Court to any facts or produced any further evidence to the contrary.

Defendant next argues that granting this leave of absence fulfilled its obligations under FEHA. The Court agrees.

Under FEHA, an employer must "engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations . . . ." Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(n). An employer fulfills these requirements if the employer in fact provided a reasonable accommodation as defined by section 12490(m). See Violan v. On Lok Senior Health Servs., 2013 WL 6907153, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2013); Tannlund-McCoy v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway & Transp. Dist., 2003 WL 21838378, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2003). Under some circumstances, a leave of absence can constitute a reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., Dep't of Fair Employment & Housing v. Lucent, 642 F.3d 728, 744 (9th Cir. 2011); Tannlund-McCoy, 2003 WL 21838378, at *7; Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 226 (1999). For instance, in Tannlund-McCoy, a bus driver suffered from anxiety resulting in a "temporary, total inability to drive a bus." Id. at *1, *7. Her employer granted her two leaves of absence, after which she was able to fully resume her job responsibilities. Id. at *7. The court held that "the [two] leave[s] of absence [ ] granted w[ere] . . . [sufficient] reasonable accommodation as a matter of law." Id.

Here, Defendant is correct that the leave of absence constituted sufficient accommodation. As in Tannlund-McCoy, Defendant granted a leave of absence for the purpose of alleviating Plaintiff's "serious health condition." It is possible that this leave would not have fully enabled Plaintiff to return to work and resume her responsibilities. And in that case, FEHA may have required Defendant to engage in further consultation and interactive process with Plaintiff. See Hanson, 74 Cal.App.4th at 226.

But such a possibility is merely speculation that cannot hold off summary judgment. See Emeldi v. University of Oregon, 698 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[M]ere speculation cannot raise an issue of fact."). This possibility was not borne out because shortly after Plaintiff began her leave of absence, her employment ended for unrelated reasons. Therefore, under the circumstances presented by the undisputed facts, the Court holds that this accommodation was adequate as a matter of law. FEHA did not compel Defendant to engage in any further process.

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendant on the third cause of action for failure to engage in the interactive process and the fourth cause of action for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. Resolving the motion on these grounds, the Court need not reach the parties' remaining arguments, including whether the restrictions in the Work Status/Progress Reports left Plaintiff unable to perform any duties and whether assigning her to a new supervisor was requested or required.

III. ORDER

The Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action and reaffirms its prior decision granting summary judgment for Defendant on all of the other causes of action in Plaintiff's Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.