ORDER

ALLISON CLAIRE, Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the court are the following motions: (1) defendant moves for clarification of the court's November 5, 2014 order on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment; (2) plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action, moves for the appointment of counsel; (3) plaintiff moves for an emergency injunction requiring "defendants CDC medical facilitators" to provide plaintiff with pain medication, and for an emergency injunction appointing a doctor to address his pain issues. Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. ECF Nos. 6 & 21. For the reasons set forth below, the first two motions will be denied, and defendant will be required to respond to the third motion, to the degree it seeks emergency injunctive relief.

1. Defendant's motion for clarification

In the court's November 5, 2014 order, which resolved the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that plaintiff's exhaustion of his "Appeal 1775" was excused because the erroneous instructions he was given on how to proceed with the appeal effectively blocked him from exhausting the appeal. The court further held that plaintiff could have exhausted this appeal had he been properly instructed. Defendant seeks "clarification" because, he asserts, the court's order must have resulted from a clerical mistake or from oversight or omission.

First, defendant argues that the court must have overlooked his "uncontested" evidence that plaintiff "could not have exhausted his 602 health care appeal 1775 within a period of only two months, which is how little time Plaintiff waited before filing his lawsuit after he was first seen by Dr. Palagummi." ECF No. 60 at 2. Second, defendant seeks clarification of how the court concluded that plaintiff "`could have exhausted his appeal' . . . during this two month period despite the fact that neither side submitted any evidence to show that this appeal could have been processed through the Third or Director level in only two months." ECF No. 60 at 2 (emphasis in text).

There is no need for clarification of either matter. First, defendant's "evidence" about the amount of time it would take for plaintiff to exhaust Appeal 1775 claim is not relevant, since the court held that exhaustion was excused, not that it had been completed in two months. Second, the court did not hold that plaintiff could have exhausted his appeal "during this two month period." Rather, the court held that "plaintiff could have exhausted his appeal had he been properly instructed," not that he could have done so within a two month time period.1 The motion for clarification will accordingly be denied.

2. Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the district court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990).

The test for exceptional circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel. In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, the motion for appointment of counsel will be denied, without prejudice.

3. Plaintiff's emergency request for pain medication and a new doctor2

This court has permitted this lawsuit to proceed on plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in that, among other things, he has been denied proper pain management, including pain medication. On November 19 and 21, 2014, plaintiff filed motions, which the court construes as requests for a preliminary injunction, asking the court to order that his pain medications be restored, and that he be appointed a different doctor to manage his pain. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Palagummi, the last remaining named defendant, is deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious medical needs, and specifically, that defendant has stopped plaintiff's necessary pain and seizure medication for no medical reason. Defendant will be ordered to respond to this motion.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within fourteen days of the date of this order, defendant Dr. Palagummi must file a response to the plaintiff's emergency motions (ECF Nos. 63 & 64), other than the request for appointment of counsel. The court construes those motions as motions for preliminary injunctive relief for an order directing the renewal of plaintiff's pain and seizure medication. There will be no extension of time granted for defendant's response;

2. Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 63) is DENIED without prejudice;

3. Defendant's motion for clarification (ECF No. 60), construed as a motion for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) & (b), is DENIED.