STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE, AND TO EXCLUDE TIME PURSUANT TO THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 2, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until December 16, 2014 at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between December 2, 2014, and December 16, 2014, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. Counsel for defendant requires additional time to review the proposed plea agreement with the defendant, to examine possible defenses and to continue investigating the facts of the case.

b. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

c. The Government does not object to the continuance.

Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. section 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 2, 2014, to December 16, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. Based on the stipulation of the parties and the recitation of facts contained therein, the Court finds that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings and trial itself within the time limits established in 18 U.S.C. section 3161. In addition, the Court specifically finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel to this stipulation reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

The Court orders that the time from the date of the parties' stipulation, December 2, 2014, to and including December 16, 2013, shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv), and Local Code T4 (reasonable time for defense counsel to prepare). It is further ordered that the next status conference shall be held on December 16, 2014, at 9:30 a.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.