STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

STIPULATION

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 9, 2014.

2. By this stipulation, defendant Paul Sanfilippo, by and through his undersigned counsel, now moves to continue the status conference until February 10, 2015 at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between December 9, 2014 and February 10, 2015, under Local Code T4.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes several hundred pages of documents in addition to a significant amount of computer evidence. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b) The United States has provided a plea agreement to the defendant. Defense counsel will need additional time to review the agreement as well as the discovery in the case with respect to the terms and factual basis of the agreement, and consult with his client regarding implications for trial.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The United States does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 9, 2014 to February 10, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.