SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge.
On December 23, 2011, Plaintiff Martin Lee Brooks ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint seeking judicial review of an Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision denying Plaintiff's application for Social Security benefits. (Doc. 1.)
In assessing Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC"), the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was able to "perform simple, routine tasks with occasional public contact," and concluded Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 24.) In seeking reversal of the ALJ's decision, Plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the ALJ credited the opinion of Dr. Loomis in determining Plaintiff's RFC, but did not adopt the wording Dr. Loomis used to describe Plaintiff's mental abilities, which was error.
In rejecting Plaintiff's argument, the Court noted that Dr. Patterson, another non-examining physician credited by the ALJ, concluded that Plaintiff was "capable of understanding and remembering at least simple instructions and can effectively perform routine tasks." (AR 501.) The Court reasoned that it was within the province of the ALJ to interpret the medical evidence and resolve any ambiguities or inconsistencies that might exist. As such, the ALJ was entitled to interpret Dr. Loomis' findings in the context of his complete report, as well as Dr. Patterson's opinion, to formulate the RFC. The ALJ was not required to adopt the exact language used by Dr. Loomis in describing Plaintiff's abilities.
In his motion to amend the judgment, Plaintiff argues the Court erred in considering Dr. Loomis' opinion. Plaintiff maintains the regulations require Dr. Loomis' opinion to be stated and interpreted as the maximum Plaintiff can do — i.e., tasks with only one or two-step instructions — and cannot be translated into an RFC for remembering "simple instructions" and performing "routine tasks." (Doc. 27.)
Courts may alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Rule 59(e) is generally seen as "an `extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly'" and at the discretion of the Court. Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see also McQuillion v. Duncan, 342 F.3d 1012, 1013 (9th Cir. 2003). A motion to alter or amend a judgment "`should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.'" McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citations omitted). "To succeed [on a motion to alter or amend judgment], a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision." United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001). Thus, "`[m]ere doubts or disagreements about the wisdom of the prior decision of this or a lower court will not suffice[.]'" Campion v. Old Republic Home Protection Co., 2011 WL 1935967, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2011) (quoting Hopewood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 273 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted)). "To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike [a court] as more than just maybe wrong or probably wrong; it must be dead wrong." Id.
In his opening brief, Plaintiff asserted that, although the ALJ credited the state agency physicians Dr. Loomis and Dr. Patterson, not all the limitations to which they opined were included in the ALJ's RFC Assessment. Specifically, Dr. Loomis opined Plaintiff could understand, remember, and carry out simple one to two-step tasks, but a limitation to one to two-step tasks was not included in the RFC. Rather, as to Plaintiff's mental functioning, the ALJ's determined Plaintiff had the RFC to perform simple, routine tasks with occasional public contact. (AR 24.) In considering Plaintiff's argument, the Court reasoned as follows:
(Doc. 25, 21:12-22:22.)
In his motion to amend the judgment, Plaintiff contends the Court misread Mr. Loomis' opinion that Plaintiff was capable of "carrying out simple one to two step tasks." Plaintiff argues Dr. Loomis' wording must be strictly interpreted, pursuant to the Regulations, as the limit of Plaintiff's ability. If the phrase was only a statement of what Plaintiff was able to do, rather than an opinion as to the most Plaintiff was able to do, Dr. Loomis would be in violation of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1); 416.945(a)(1).
Section 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) provides as follows:
The regulations Plaintiff cites relate to the RFC the ALJ formulates when the case is pending before the ALJ (see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c)) — not the residual functional capacity form the non-examining state agency physicians complete for the ALJ's consideration.
However, even if Dr. Loomis was required by Sections 404.1545(a)(1) and 416.945(a)(1) to state his opinion in terms of the maximum ability he believed Plaintiff possessed, Dr. Patterson — as discussed in the underlying decision — opined that Plaintiff was capable of understanding and remembering at least simple instructions and can effectively perform routine tasks. (AR 501.) The ALJ, in crediting both opinions, was entitled to synthesize the terminology the doctors used in formulating their opinions, as the ALJ alone was responsible for formulating the RFC. It is within the province of the ALJ to interpret the medical evidence and resolve any ambiguities or inconsistencies that might exist. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ was entitled to interpret Dr. Loomis' findings in the context of Dr. Loomis' complete report, as well as Dr. Patterson's opinion, to formulate the RFC — the ALJ was not required to adopt the exact language used by Dr. Loomis in crediting the opinion.
Plaintiff's argument does not meet the Rule 59 standard for reconsideration — Plaintiff's motion is merely a request that the Court reconsider its earlier decision. As such, Plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.