Filed: Jan. 16, 2015
Latest Update: Jan. 16, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 20, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendants Rigoberto Cecena, Elisabet Perez and Yusen Valenzuela-Herrera, by and through their undersigned counsel, now move to continue the status conference until March 24, 2015, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between January 20, 2015 and March 24, 2015, under
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 20, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendants Rigoberto Cecena, Elisabet Perez and Yusen Valenzuela-Herrera, by and through their undersigned counsel, now move to continue the status conference until March 24, 2015, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between January 20, 2015 and March 24, 2015, under ..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 20, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendants Rigoberto Cecena, Elisabet Perez and Yusen Valenzuela-Herrera, by and through their undersigned counsel, now move to continue the status conference until March 24, 2015, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between January 20, 2015 and March 24, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 100 pages of documents and photographs, including investigative reports. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, conduct investigation and research, review discovery, and to discuss potential resolutions with their clients.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e) The United States does not object to the continuance.
f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 20, 2015 to March 24, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
