ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Sacramento County's ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #44) the first cause of action in Plaintiff James Hass' ("Plaintiff") Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") (Doc. #42). Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. #49) and Defendant filed a reply (Doc. #51). For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

From February 8, 2011 to March 5, 2011, Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Sacramento County Jail. TAC ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant County deprived Plaintiff of a humane environment" during his incarceration. TAC ¶ 34. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was kept in a windowless cell along with "large bags of kitchen garbage," and was not provided time to exercise, shower, or "access news." TAC ¶ 22.

Plaintiff also alleges that, on his first day in custody, he "went through the routine intake processing" at the jail, which included "an interview with a person from the medical staff or employee designated by Defendant County to obtain the medical information from Plaintiff." TAC ¶¶ 37-38. During this interview, Plaintiff disclosed a number of medical conditions including hypertension, acute sleep apnea, diabetes, and a history of strokes. TAC ¶ 39. Plaintiff was originally provided with blood pressure medication but, at some point during his incarceration, "Defendant County withdrew all medications from Plaintiff and deprived Plaintiff of access to a [sleep apnea] CPAP machine." TAC ¶¶ 45, 46. Plaintiff alleges that, "as a proximate result of Defendant's deprivation to Plaintiff of his legally prescribed medications and medical equipment," Plaintiff "became fearful for his life," became "demoralized," suffered "emotional distress, humiliation, depression and a decline in his physical health." TAC ¶¶ 58, 59. Plaintiff also alleges that he subsequently "became alienated from his wife and the marriage has not been restored." TAC ¶ 64.

Plaintiff was represented by Sean Gjerde ("Defendant Gjerde") in the family court matter which gave rise to his civil confinement. SAC ¶ 4. Defendant Gjerde's representation of Plaintiff is the subject matter of Plaintiff's second through sixth causes of action. However, as Defendant County's motion to dismiss only addresses Plaintiff's first cause of action, the facts of Defendant Gjerde's representation are not relevant to its motion and are not summarized here.

On March 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed the initial complaint in Sacramento County Superior Court. On August 22, 2013, Defendants removed the matter to this Court. On August 29, 2013, Defendant County filed a motion to dismiss the initial complaint. On December 20, 2013, the Court granted Defendant County's motion to dismiss, but gave Plaintiff leave to amend his civil rights claim against the County. On January 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). On January 27, 2014, Defendant County filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's FAC. On April 18, 2014, the Court granted Defendant County's motion to dismiss, again giving Plaintiff leave to amend his civil rights claim. On May 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). On May 27, 2014, Defendant County filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's SAC. On October 8, 2014, the Court granted Defendant County's motion to dismiss, again with leave to amend.

On October 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint. The TAC includes the following causes of action: (1) "Violation of Civil Rights — Defendant County;" (2) Malpractice in the family law matter; (3) Malpractice for failure to keep client advised; (4) Malpractice for loss of $70,000 from Home Depot; (5) Malpractice for loss of business, personal assets and home; and (6) "Fraud and Deceit/False Promise."

II. OPINION

Plaintiff's only claim against Defendant County alleges a "violation of [his] civil rights." TAC at 3. As in his previous complaints, Plaintiff does not expressly invoke a statute, but it can be inferred that his claim is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As Plaintiff has sued Defendant County, his civil rights claim takes the form of a § 1983 Monell claim. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

Although a municipality can be sued under § 1983, "it cannot be held liable unless a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional injury." Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993). Accordingly, to state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that an official policy or custom existed; (2) that the plaintiff suffered constitutional injury; and (3) the existence of a causal link between the policy/custom and the plaintiff's injury. Id. Moreover, each of these elements must be alleged with "sufficient particularity" and general or conclusory allegations will not suffice. See, e.g., Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (approving the dismissal of a Monell claim, on the grounds that "the complaint did not allege a deliberate County policy with sufficient particularity").

Plaintiff argues that his civil rights were violated because, "[d]uring his incarceration for 26 days in the Sacramento County Main Jail, he was denied prescription medications for high blood pressure and diabetes as well as his medical equipment for acute sleep apnea." Opp. at 2. Plaintiff argues that Defendant County should be held liable for this deprivation because it had an official policy of "provid[ing] a safe and humane environment" for inmates, and "the deficiencies in the execution of the policy stem from a lack of training and/or a lack of supervision." Opp. at 5-6. Relatedly, Plaintiff argues that Defendant County was deliberately indifferent to the violation of Plaintiff's civil rights. Opp. at 13.

Plaintiff's continued reliance on the Mission and Goals Statement published by Defendant County demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the Monell requirements. As the Court wrote in its October 8, 2014 order:

Plaintiff has provided no authority or reasons for the Court to reconsider this conclusion. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot rely on Defendant County's Missions and Goals Statement as an official policy, for purposes of his Monell claim.

As Plaintiff has not alleged that an official County policy caused the violations, his Monell claim rests entirely on his allegations that Defendant County failed to adequately train its employees in providing medical care to inmates. The Supreme Court has held that a municipality's failure to train its employees may create § 1983 liability where the "failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [employees] come into contact." City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The Court further explained that, to establish a municipality's deliberate indifference, a Plaintiff must show that "the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. Subsequently, the Supreme Court noted that "[a] municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train." Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011). Moreover, "adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the training program or the legal basis for holding the [municipality] liable." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.

Plaintiff makes the following allegations, which directly relate to his "failure to train" theory: "Defendant County failed to adequately train and/or supervise its agents and/or employees with respect to providing currently prescribed medications to inmates" (TAC ¶ 54); "Defendant County demonstrated `deliberate indifference' to the welfare and health of Plaintiff" (TAC ¶ 55); and "Defendant [County] failed to either supervise and/or train staff at the Main Jail regarding identification [of] these [suicide] risk factors and/or the procedures to follow to reduce Plaintiff's distress and/or prevent injury or death" (TAC ¶ 32). These allegations are precisely the type of "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action" that the Supreme Court has cautioned will not withstand a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The above statements are unsupported by any specific factual allegations, regarding the details of Defendant County's alleged training program, precisely how that training program was deficient, or how such a deficiency caused Plaintiff's injuries. In the absence of more specific allegations, Plaintiff's "failure to train" theory of municipal liability cannot survive Defendant County's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff also fails to identify any individuals at a policymaking level with Defendant County who acted with "deliberate indifference" to Plaintiff's medical needs. As noted above, a finding of deliberate indifference by a municipality is only appropriate where "the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. Thus, the relevant actions (or lack thereof) are those taken by individuals at the policymaking level. At no point does Plaintiff allege that policymakers were aware of his medical condition and failed to provide proper care. Plaintiff generally alleges that "Defendant County withdrew all medications from Plaintiff" and that "Defendant County had actual knowledge of Plaintiff's medical needs and conditions at the time that he was processed into the Main Jail." TAC ¶¶ 42, 46. Plaintiff does not allege that an individual at the policymaking level was personally responsible for inmate intake or dispensation of medication, nor would such an allegation be credible. Rather these allegations appear to refer to the actions of individual non-policymaking employees of Defendant County. Such actions are not relevant in determining municipal liability.

For precisely the same reason, Plaintiff's argument that his medical needs were obvious to Defendant County is misplaced. Opp. at 9. Whether Plaintiff's medical needs were obvious to non-policymaking individuals at the County Jail is irrelevant. Rather, Plaintiff needs to have alleged that Defendant County's policymakers were aware that their training program was deficient, and that these policymakers made a "conscious or deliberate" choice to ignore that deficiency. Rimac v. Duncan, 319 F. App'x 535, 538 (9th Cir. 2009). As discussed above, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged such conduct.

Similarly, Plaintiff's argument as to the "risk factors for suicide" identified by then-Jail Commander Scott Jones fails. TAC ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant took no actions to reduce Plaintiff's distress or exposure to Defendant's identified risk factors for suicide," primarily solitary confinement for a first-time inmate. TAC ¶ 31. Again, in the absence of a sufficiently alleged policy or custom of placing first-time inmates in solitary confinement, such actions can only be attributed to individual, non-policymaking employees of Defendant County. These actions are not relevant in determining municipal liability.

To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to argue that Defendant County had developed an unofficial custom of failure to properly provide medications to inmates, his allegations are insufficient to establish such a custom. Plaintiff's sole allegation in this regard is that "[b]etween 2007 and 2013, at least 12 inmates in the custody of Defendant died as a result of medical issues that arose while the inmate was in custody." TAC ¶ 36. This statement is unaccompanied by any further allegations as to the details of these 12 deaths. The fact that these deaths occurred "as a result of medical issues that arose while the inmate was in custody" does not necessarily mean that such deaths resulted from improper care or failure to provide medication. Without more, this barebones allegation is insufficient to establish an unofficial County custom.

Finally, as to Plaintiff's continued reliance on the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Brown v. Plata, the Court refers to the finding made in its April 18, 2014 Order:

Plaintiff has presented no authority or reasons for the Court to reconsider this finding.

Dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate only where it is "clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by amendment." Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint three times, and each time Plaintiff has been unable to successfully do so. Moreover, in opposing each of Defendant County's repeated motions to dismiss, Plaintiff has continued to make arguments that have been consistently rejected by the Court. See supra at 4-5, 8-9. The Court concludes that allowing Plaintiff leave to file a fifth complaint would be inappropriate, as amendment would be futile. Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Defendant County's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's first cause of action. As Plaintiff's sole cause of action against Defendant County is dismissed without leave to amend, the matter will proceed without Defendant County.

IT IS SO ORDERED.