Filed: Feb. 13, 2015
Latest Update: Feb. 13, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 12, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 2, 2015, and to exclude time between March 12, 2015, and April 2, 2015, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The govern
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge. STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 12, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 2, 2015, and to exclude time between March 12, 2015, and April 2, 2015, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The governm..
More
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 12, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 2, 2015, and to exclude time between March 12, 2015, and April 2, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, search warrant affidavits, judgment and commitment records, CDs and DVDs, and RAP sheets of the defendants. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time review the materials, conduct further investigation, consult with their clients, engage in pre-trial negotiations with the government, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 12, 2015 to April 2, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
