ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT MILLER'S MOTION TO DISMISS

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Kenneth Miller's ("Defendant") motion to dismiss the seventh and ninth causes of action (Doc. #10) of Plaintiff ("Plaintiff") Drew Gardner's complaint (Doc. #1). For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is DENIED.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 2, 2014, Plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a Jeep Wrangler that had been reported stolen. Compl. ¶¶ 16-17. Upon seeing a police car, the driver of the Jeep abandoned the car and told Plaintiff to do the same. Compl. ¶ 18. Plaintiff was apprehended and taken into custody at Tehama County Jail. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 25. During booking, the arresting officer reported confiscating a "clear white baggie with a white crystalline substance" — which tested positive for methamphetamine — from Plaintiff's jacket. Compl. ¶ 26.

On January 3, 2014, Ed McCullough — a deputy investigator with the Tehama County Sheriff's Department — was tasked with conducting an investigation of this incident. Compl. ¶ 30. McCullough interviewed Plaintiff, who told him that he was a passenger in the car and had been offered a ride by Charles Jacob Steele, whom "he had just met at a mutual friend's house." Compl. ¶ 32. Plaintiff informed McCullough that, prior to his arrest, they had stopped at a car dealership and a gas station, and that witnesses at both locations could confirm that he was not the driver of the stolen vehicle. Compl. ¶¶ 33-34. McCullough followed up on both of these leads, and spoke with a witness at the car dealership. Compl. ¶ 34. The witness picked Plaintiff out of a photo line-up, and identified him as the passenger of the vehicle. Compl. ¶ 35. McCullough allegedly "failed to alert anyone at the Tehama [County] District Attorney's office, the Tehama County Jail, or the Shasta County Sheriff's department" of these exculpatory findings. Compl. ¶ 36.

On January 6, 2014, Plaintiff was charged with: (1) unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle; (2) receiving stolen property — motor vehicle; (3) driving under the influence; (4) bringing contraband into the jail; (5) possession of a controlled substance; and (6) carrying a dirk or dagger. Compl. ¶ 38. Defendant Kenneth Miller was assigned to be his public defender. Compl. ¶ 41.

On January 8, 2014, McCullough resumed his investigation and visited the gas station at which Plaintiff claimed to have stopped before his arrest. Compl. ¶ 42. He obtained video surveillance from the date of the incident, and allegedly observed that Plaintiff was the passenger in the vehicle. Compl. ¶ 42. McCullough wrote up a report of his findings ("the McCullough Report"), but it is unclear when this report was filed with the Tehama County District Attorney's Office. Compl. ¶ 45. Plaintiff alleges that it "failed to make its way to the Tehama County District Attorney's Office" during the period that Defendant represented Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 48.

Between January 6, 2014 — when he was appointed as Plaintiff's attorney — and February 25, 2014 — when he was fired by Plaintiff — Defendant Miller allegedly "never once interviewed Plaintiff to obtain Plaintiff's version of the facts nor conducted any investigation." Compl. ¶ 47. On February 7, 2014, Plaintiff's mother retained private counsel to represent Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 49. Plaintiff's retained counsel conducted an investigation and allegedly discovered substantially the same exculpatory information which McCullough had learned through his official investigation. Compl. ¶¶ 50-53. On March 12, 2014, Plaintiff's retained counsel sent a letter summarizing its findings to the Tehama County District Attorney's Office. Compl. ¶ 54. That same day, the Tehama County District Attorney provided Plaintiff with a copy of the McCullough Report. Compl. ¶ 55. On March 17, 2014, the three vehicle-related counts against Plaintiff were dropped. Compl. ¶ 56. Plaintiff remained in custody on the three booking-related pending charges. Compl. ¶ 56.

On April 1, 2014, Plaintiff "persuaded Sargeant Baulkin at the Tehama County Jail to look at the booking video." Compl. ¶ 58. The video showed that Plaintiff was not wearing the jacket which allegedly contained the "baggie of meth" confiscated during booking. Compl. ¶ 58. Instead, the video showed that the arresting officer carried the jacket into the booking room. Compl. ¶ 58. On April 21, 2014, the remaining counts relating to Plaintiff's booking were dismissed. Compl. ¶ 59. Plaintiff was released from custody that day. Compl. ¶ 59.

On October 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed his complaint in Tehama County Superior Court. On November 11, 2014, Defendants removed the matter to this Court. The Complaint includes nine causes of action. As noted above, only the seventh cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and the ninth cause of action for professional negligence are brought against the moving defendant Kenneth Miller. The remaining causes of action are brought against individual officers and municipal police entities for their alleged role played in Plaintiff's arrest and incarceration.

II. OPINION

A. Judicial Notice

Defendant Miller requests that the Court take judicial notice (Doc. #11) of the complaint filed in this action. The complaint is already part of the record in this case, and the request is denied as unnecessary.

B. Discussion

Defendant Miller argues that both causes of action brought against him — negligent infliction of emotional distress and professional negligence — must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish the essential element of causation. Mot. at 7. Specifically, Defendant Miller argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege that he would have spent less time in jail if Defendant had competently represented him. Mot. at 8. Plaintiff responds that Defendant's inaction — especially his failure to interview Plaintiff during the entirety of his representation — "resulted in additional jail time for Plaintiff." Opp. at 3-4.

Causation is a necessary element of both negligent infliction of emotional distress and professional negligence. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal.3d 583, 588 (1989); Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal.4th 811, 821 (2011). Thus, to state a claim for these two causes of action, Plaintiff must allege that the harm would not have occurred "but for" Defendant's breach of his duty. In other words, Plaintiff must allege facts which give rise to a reasonable inference that he would have spent less time in jail if Defendant had been reasonably competent in representing him.

Plaintiff was in custody from January 2, 2014 until April 21, 2014, for a total of 110 days (Plaintiff's calculation of 91 days appears to be incorrect). Compl. ¶¶ 26, 59. Plaintiff's release was the result of two discrete events. First, on March 12, 2014, Plaintiff's retained counsel obtained a copy of the exculpatory McCullough Report from the Tehama County District Attorney's Office. Compl. ¶¶ 54-55. This led to the dismissal of the three vehicle-related counts against Plaintiff, on March 17, 2014. Compl. ¶ 56. Second, on April 1, 2014, Plaintiff "persuaded Sargeant Baulkin at the Tehama County Jail to look at the booking video," which showed that Plaintiff was not wearing the jacket which contained a "baggie of meth." Compl. ¶ 58. Approximately three weeks later, the remaining counts "related to [the] booking of Plaintiff" were dismissed. Compl. ¶ 59.

Plaintiff has alleged that he was represented by Defendant Miller from January 6, 2014 until February 25, 2014 — roughly seven weeks. Compl. ¶¶ 41, 47. During these seven weeks, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Miller "never once interviewed Plaintiff to obtain Plaintiff's version of the facts nor conducted any investigation." Compl. ¶ 47. The following inferences can reasonably be drawn from Plaintiff's factual allegations: (1) if Defendant Miller had interviewed his client promptly, he would have learned that Plaintiff was not wearing the jacket at booking; (2) Defendant Miller would have relayed this information to the apparently-cooperative Sargeant Baulkin (or another equally helpful corrections officer), and would have been permitted to view the booking video; (3) the video would have revealed that Plaintiff was not wearing the jacket at the time of booking, and the booking-related charges would have been dismissed well before April 21, 2014. Thus, even if the exculpatory McCullough Report did not surface until March 12, 2014, Plaintiff would still have been released on March 17, 2014, when the only remaining counts — the three vehicle-related charges — were dismissed. Thus, Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to establish that Defendant Miller's failure to interview Plaintiff could have plausibly caused Plaintiff to spend more time in custody.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff "can only speculate that the district attorney's office might have dropped the charges sooner had a more aggressive defense been initiated during Mr. Miller's short representation." Mot. at 9. However, in considering a motion to dismiss, the Court "must . . . draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). As noted above, Plaintiff's factual allegations — and all favorable, reasonable inferences drawn from these allegations — "plausibly suggest" that Plaintiff is entitled to relief on his professional negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101, 182 L. Ed. 2d 882 (U.S. 2012). It is far from speculation to infer that, had Defendant promptly interviewed Plaintiff, the events leading to Plaintiff's release would have unfolded exactly as they did in reality, albeit much sooner. As discussed above, this would have ensured Plaintiff's release on March 17, 2014, as opposed to April 21, 2014.

Given the liberal standard required to be applied by the Court on a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded the element of causation for both negligent infliction of emotional distress and professional negligence. As Defendant Miller has only challenged Plaintiff's allegations with regard to the element of causation, his motion to dismiss is DENIED.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant Miller's motion to dismiss:

IT IS SO ORDERED.