STIPULATION TO SET MATTER FOR CHANGE OF PLEA AND REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; PROPOSED FINDINGS AND ORDER

[18 U.S.C. § 3161]

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant Florence Francisco, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order this matter was set for a status hearing on March 26, 2015.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to set this matter for a change of plea hearing on May 7, 2015 and to exclude time between March 26, 2015 and May 7, 2015, under Local Codes T4 and T2. The United States does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, loan records, and related documents in electronic form that constitute approximately 40,000 pages. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.

b) The United States has provided defense counsel a plea agreement, and the defendant has requested to set the matter for a change of plea on May 7, 2015, based on the limited availability of her counsel until that date and the defendant's need to attend to the medical care of another individual.

c) Counsel for the defendant desire additional time to review discovery with respect to the proposed plea agreement.

d) Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e) The United States does not object to the continuance.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 26, 2015 and May 7, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

h) This time period is also deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(ii) [Local Code T2] on the basis that the case is complex due to the number of defendants and nature of the prosecution.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, this matter is set for a change of plea hearing on May 7, 2015 at 9:00 a.m. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., the time period of March 26, 2015 and May 7, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4I] and 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(ii) [Local Code T2]. The ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial

IT IS SO ORDERED.