ORDER

KIMBERLY J. MUELLER, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on the motion by defendants Shasta County (County) and Shasta County Sheriff's Department (Sheriff's Department) (collectively, defendants) to dismiss plaintiffs' first amended complaint, arguing it is not possible to comprehend the essence of the allegations against the County defendants. (ECF No. 13 at 1.) In the alternative, they argue the complaint against them should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)2 because the County defendants did not participate in the incident at issue. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiffs believe defendants' motion is better understood as a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). (ECF No. 17 at 1.) In the alternative, if the court were to treat defendants' motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and grant it, plaintiffs request leave to amend. (Id. at 2.)

The court held a hearing on the matter on April 24, 2015. Larry Baumbach appeared for plaintiffs and James Ross for defendants. After having carefully considered the parties' briefs, oral arguments, and the record, the court GRANTS defendants' motion with leave to amend in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, individually and as co-administrators of William Robinson's estate, bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 9.) Plaintiffs are the decedent's parents and his only surviving heirs. (Id.) Defendants are alleged to have been "charged with conducting the duties of coroner for all deaths occurring within Shasta County." (Id. ¶ 2.)

On July 20, 2014,3 the decedent was transported in a transportation vehicle from the Enloe Medical Center in Chico, California to the RestPadd Psychiatric Health Facility in Redding, California for rehabilitation and treatment purposes. (Id. ¶ 7.) Upon arrival, the decedent became severely agitated while in the back seat. (Id.) Because of the decedent's mental state, RestPadd did not admit him into the facility and recommended he be taken to the Mercy Medical Center. (Id.) Upon arrival at the Mercy Medical Center, the medical transport driver called Redding Police to assist with removing decedent from the car. (Id.) Two Redding police officers arrived and attempted to remove the decedent from the car. (Id.) The decedent resisted; he "attempt[ed] to pull away." (Id.) The officers ultimately took him to the ground, and while on the ground, one of the police officers began beating him. (Id.) When the decedent had stopped breathing, the paramedics on the scene began resuscitation, and the decedent was later taken to the Mercy Medical Center. (Id.) The decedent remained in a coma until he passed away on July 27, 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 11.)

The only paragraph in the complaint that pertains to the County and the Sheriff's Department alleges as follows:

(Id. ¶ 8.)

The operative complaint alleges six claims: (1) wrongful death; (2) injury resulting in death; (3) municipal liability; (4) wrongful death under state law; (5) violation of California Civil Code section 51.7; and (6) negligent hiring. (See generally ECF No. 9.) Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint (ECF No. 13); plaintiffs oppose the motion (ECF No. 17), and defendants have replied (ECF No. 18).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A court may dismiss "based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Although a complaint need contain only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), to survive a motion to dismiss this short and plain statement "must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must include something more than "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation" or "`labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses on the interplay between the factual allegations of the complaint and the dispositive issues of law in the action. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

In making this context-specific evaluation, this court "must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). This rule does not apply to "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, to "allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice," or to material attached to or incorporated by reference into the complaint, Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sheriff's Department

At the hearing on the instant motion, plaintiffs conceded that the Sheriff's Department should be dismissed with prejudice because the County is the proper entity to be named as a defendant in this case. See Melendres v. Arpaio, No. 13-16285, 2015 WL 1654550, at *3 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2015) (ordering Maricopa County be substituted as a party in lieu of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office). Accordingly, the court DISMISSES the Sheriff's Department with prejudice.

B. State-Law Claims

At the hearing on the instant motion, the parties similarly agreed that plaintiffs' state-law claims against the County should be dismissed with prejudice. Therefore, according to the parties' stipulation, the court DISMISSES plaintiffs' state-law claims against the County with prejudice.

C. Plaintiffs' Remaining Claims

As to plaintiffs' remaining claims, the court finds the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to give notice of the nature of the claim or claims under which plaintiffs seek to proceed. In their opposition brief, however, plaintiffs attest that they can amend the complaint, consonant with Rule 11, to state a viable claim against the County. (See ECF No. 17 at 2 ("[I]t is the position of Plaintiffs that a revision of Plaintiffs' complaint can clarify the allegations against the County so as to constitute a violation of . . . Plaintiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C 1983 [sic].")). See Bautista v. Los Angeles Cnty., 216 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2000) ("A claim is the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts." (internal quotation marks omitted)). At the hearing on the instant motion, plaintiffs' counsel reaffirmed that position and stated that he could allege sufficient facts showing the County's improper performance of the Coroner's duties. The court thus GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to amend. In granting plaintiffs leave to amend, the court reminds counsel that as a matter of good practice, each claim should be separately numbered under a separate heading briefly identifying the nature of the claim asserted and the defendants against whom the claim is asserted.

IV. MEET AND CONFER EFFORTS

This court's Standing Order requires parties to meet and confer to discuss thoroughly the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential resolution before filing a motion. (Standing Order at 3, ECF No. 3-1.) The purpose of this requirement is to allow plaintiff's counsel to carefully evaluate defendant's contentions and determine whether an agreement can be reached to cure any defects. (Id.) Counsel should resolve minor procedural or other non-substantive matters during these discussion. (Id.)

Here, despite the repeated efforts of defendants' counsel to engage in meet and confer with plaintiffs' counsel on three occasions, including their offer to stipulate to a further amendment, plaintiffs' counsel did not respond. (ECF No. 13-1 at 3-4.) At the hearing, plaintiffs' counsel accepted responsibility for his failures. Given the explanation and acceptance of responsibility, the court declines to sanction him. However, the court cautions plaintiffs' counsel that he will likely be sanctioned for any future failures to comply with the court's Standing Order.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court orders as follows:

IT IS SO ORDERED.