Filed: May 29, 2015
Latest Update: May 29, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant HEATHER MOSES, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 4, 2015, at 9:30 a.m. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 27, 2015, at
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant HEATHER MOSES, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 4, 2015, at 9:30 a.m. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 27, 2015, at ..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant HEATHER MOSES, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 4, 2015, at 9:30 a.m. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until
August 27, 2015, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between June 4, 2015, and August 27, 2015, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has produced approximately 2,500 pages of discovery to the defense.
b. The government and defense have actively been negotiating a settlement in this case which has involved the disclosure of mitigation documentation by the defense and a substantive face to face meeting.
c. Defense counsel and defendant have actively been working on attempting to settle the case. However, the defense counsel needs additional time to have further discussions with the Government and his client.
d. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. The government does not object to the continuance.
f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 4, 2015, to August 27, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
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4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: May 29, 2015
/s/Jared Dolan
Jared Dolan
Assistant United States Attorney
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
