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U.S. v. BINI, 2:13-CR-332 GEB. (2015)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20150611951 Visitors: 16
Filed: Jun. 09, 2015
Latest Update: Jun. 09, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr. , Senior District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Tina Marie Bini and Matthew Lee Boyle, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was for a status and change of plea hearing on June 12, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendants no
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Tina Marie Bini and Matthew Lee Boyle, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was for a status and change of plea hearing on June 12, 2015.

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status and change of plea hearing until June 19, 2015 and to exclude time between June 12, 2015 and June 19, 2015 under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and wiretap applications in electronic form constituting approximately 1600 pages of documents. The United States also represents that the discovery includes approximately 20 CDs of audio recordings, including intercepted communications, and transcripts and line reports. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.

b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients in order to finalize the terms of plea agreements which have been provided by the United States.

c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The United States does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 12, 2015 through June 19, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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