Filed: Jun. 12, 2015
Latest Update: Jun. 12, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for jury trial on September 21, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the jury trial to December 7, 2015, at 9:00 a.m., with a
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for jury trial on September 21, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the jury trial to December 7, 2015, at 9:00 a.m., with a ..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for jury trial on September 21, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the jury trial to December 7, 2015, at 9:00 a.m., with a trial confirmation hearing on October 27, 2015, at 9:15 a.m. The parties also stipulate to exclude between September 21, 2015, and December 7, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has produced discovery to defense counsel relating to this case, including investigative reports and financial records. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendant and government believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and would deny the government and defendant continuity of counsel.
c) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 21, 2015 to December 7, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at parties' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
