STANLEY A. BOONE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff John Catanzarite is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This action is proceeding on Plaintiff's due process claim against Defendants Carrasco, Croxton, Drake, Gassaway, Gonzalez, Holland, Liles, Marshall, McLaughlin, Miner, Nipper, Pierce, Reed, Rouston, Schulteis, Snider, Steadman, and Walker.
Defendants previously filed a motion to dismiss, and the Court dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims that occurred before September 6, 2008.
On January 16, 2015, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies. Pursuant to court order, Plaintiff filed an opposition on May 4, 2015, and Defendants filed a reply on May 11, 2015.
Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted);
Defendants do not bear the burden of proof at trial and in moving for summary judgment, they need only prove an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff's case.
However, in judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence,
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Prisoners are required to exhaust the available administrative remedies prior to filing suit.
The failure to exhaust in compliance with section 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense under which Defendant has the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.
The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) has an administrative grievance system for prisoners to appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy having an adverse effect on prisoners' welfare. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1. Prior to 2011, the process was initiated by submitting a CDC Form 602 describing the problem and the action requested, tit. 15, § 3084.2(a), and appeal had to be submitted within fifteen working days of the event being appealed or of the receipt of the unacceptable lower level decision, tit. 15, § 3084.6(c). Up to four levels of appeal may be involved, including the informal level, first formal level, second formal level, and third formal level, also known as the Director's Level. Tit. 15, § 3084.5. In order to satisfy section 1997e(a), California state prisoners are required to use this process to exhaust their claims prior to filing suit.
"[E]xhaustion is not per se inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances."
However, effective January 28, 2011, the regulations require inmates to identify the staff members involved, and provide as follows:
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3) (2011).
Between 2008 and February 1, 2012, Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP) and California Correctional Institution (CCI) authorities consciously and methodically conspired to secure and maintain Plaintiff in a perpetual state of Security Housing Unit (SHU) placement by falsifying state documents, fabricating charges, sensationalizing information, and denying Plaintiff's due process rights.
Between 2008 and December 9, 2010, Defendants Croxton, Snider, Schulteis, Liles, McLaughlin, Carrasco, Drake, Holland, and Walker willingly and knowingly retained Plaintiff in CCI-SHU without required CSR endorsement.
All Defendants were aware that the so-called "case factors" cited to justify SHU retention relative to the same were either false, fabricated, sensationalized, and/or unsubstantiated.
These factors include, but are not limited to, escape from the state of Utah and Nebraska; use of a non-inmate hostage of escape paraphernalia (backsaw blades, U.S. currency, handcuff key); attempt escape from CMF by cutting cell windows; sexual assault of medical staff; providing inmates with bomb-making blue prints of a chemical weapon; the confiscation of two drawings from Plaintiff's cell explaining the manufacture of improvised explosive devices; a written "manifesto" confirming bomb-making blue prints, plans to attack staff, and biochemical weapons; extreme escape risk due to escape history; plans to escape; and past escape attempts from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
Between 2008 and November 24, 2010, Defendants Croxton, Schulteis, McLaughlin, Liles, Carrasco, Snider, Drake, Holland, and Walker willingly and knowingly retained Plaintiff in continuous SHU placement under the pretext that Plaintiff's case was deferred to the Departmental Review Board (DRB) for future SHU placement consideration, effectively and officially relinquishing any and all authority to release Plaintiff from the SHU.
Subsequent to a discussion between Defendant Pierce and members of the Classification Service Unit on or about November 24, 2010, Defendant Pierce informed Plaintiff that his case was never submitted to the DRB for review. As a result, Plaintiff's right to periodic review amounted to no more than a "meaningless gesture," because defendants continued to retain Plaintiff in the SHU pending a review they knew would never take place.
Relative to the hearing on March 6, 2009, Defendant Liles in support of Defendant Steadmen, falsified his classification chrono, dated March 11, 2009, for which Plaintiff never received.
On April 30, 2010, Defendant Sunday willfully and knowingly denied Plaintiff's due process right to an administrative segregation hearing. Defendant Drake in support of Defendant Sunday, falsified his classification chrono dated May 5, 2010, asserting that Plaintiff's due process rights were met.
Defendant Drake consciously and methodically falsified the classification chrono dated September 2, 2009, and May 5, 2010, relative to her attempt to explain anticipated ICC action prior to the committee review indicating that Plaintiff "refused" to speak with her regarding the issue. Defendant Drake also falsified the classification chrono by stating that mental health interviewed Plaintiff prior to the hearings on September 2, 2009, and May 5, 2010, regarding his current mental health status and whether he required staff assistance to understand the issues.
During the classification hearing on May 7, 2008 and August 20, 2008, Defendants Croxton, Schulteis, and McLaughlin willingly and knowingly retained Plaintiff on indeterminate SHU status based on information they clearly knew to be untrue. During the committee review, Defendant McLaughlin verbally confirmed that with respect to the confidential memorandums dated September 2, 1994, September 23, 1994, and February 1, 1995, Plaintiff was only investigated for possible possession of escape paraphernalia and was subsequently exonerated. With respect to the confidential memorandum dated October 7, 2004, Plaintiff found a handcuff key and turned it over to custody. The Nebraska and Utah authorities verified no record of escape. Consequently, the language in the confidential chronos dated May 7, 2008 and August 20, 2008, was changed to reflect such information. However, Plaintiff was still retained in the SHU on an indeterminate basis.
Defendants Croxton, Schulteis, and McLaughlin further based the indeterminate SHU status on the premise that Plaintiff sexually assaulted a female during the hostage incident of April 2000, knowing it was untrue. Defendants Drake, Holland, and Walker also allege a sexual battery during the hostage incident in April 2000.
On November 24, 2010, and December 15, 2010, Defendants Pierce, Holland, Mine, and Walker willingly and knowingly retained Plaintiff on indeterminate SHU status based on information they clearly knew to be false and/or sensationalized. This information includes Plaintiff's use of a weapon during the hostage incident of April 2000, escape history, sexual battery of staff during the hostage incident, escape plots, and bomb-making prints.
On June 22, 2011, Defendants Pierce, Reed, and Walker retained Plaintiff on an indeterminate SHU status based on information provided by a medical doctor which they clearly knew and admitted was false. Specifically, Defendants retained Plaintiff on indeterminate SHU status based on a doctor's unqualified and unsubstantiated escape hypothesis. Said hypothesis was based on an informational chrono authored by Dr. Tate, in which he lied about an event where Plaintiff attempted to escape. Defendants utilized such information as a factor for indeterminate SHU status on June 22, 2011. Defendant Pierce confirmed this information to be false prior to June 22, 2011.
Defendants also retained Plaintiff on indeterminate SHU status based on Plaintiff's disciplinary history. On or about July 28, 2011, Plaintiff, for purposes of appeal, requested from Defendant Pierce to know the exact nature of the case factors used during the June 22, 2011, classification hearing. Defendant Pierce refused to disclose the information because he knew such information was false denying Plaintiff's due process rights.
On February 1, 2012, during the classification hearing, Defendants Pierce, Walker, and Marshall willingly and knowingly violated Plaintiff's right to due process and meaningful review by 1) refusing Plaintiff the right to present evidence; 2) refusing to disclose the case factors and/or circumstantial considerations employed to justify indeterminate SHU placement, and 3) employing information they clearly knew to be false.
The committee hearing conducted on February 1, 2012, amounted to nothing more than a "meaningless gesture," based upon Defendant Marshall's instructions. Defendant Pierce refused to disclose the case factors they employed to retain Plaintiff on an indeterminate SHU status. During classification, Defendant Marshall openly stated that it does not matter what the case factors are because you will never be released and you will spend your entire career in the SHU regardless of the case factors.
As relief, Plaintiff requests nominal damages for everyday he has spent in the SHU between November 10, 2004, and February 1, 2012, punitive damages, and an injunction ordering his release from the SHU to general population.
Defendants submit that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies by way of the three inmate grievances, relevant to this action, filed at California Correctional Institution. Defendants argue that inmate appeal No. CCI-0-11-00465 did not exhaust his grievances against any individual Defendants because the appeal was not properly exhausted in accordance with CDCR procedures, and because the factual allegations in the appeal do not match the factual allegations in this lawsuit. In addition, inmate appeal number CCI-0-12-00346 only addressed claims against Defendants Marshal, Pierce, and Walker for using "stale" or "false" evidence to retain Plaintiff in the security housing unit. Lastly, the screened-out appeal was insufficient because Plaintiff chose to ignore CDCR procedures and the instructions of the prison's Inmate Appeals Coordinator.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he exhausted the administrative remedies in full compliance with the PLRA and the applicable state procedures.
Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating the existence of an available administrative remedy and Plaintiff's failure to exhaust that available remedy.
The Supreme Court held in
Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of an available administrative remedy and Plaintiff's failure to exhaust that available remedy.
In inmate appeal number CCI-0-11-00465, submitted March 16, 2011, Plaintiff stated the following:
(ECF No. 69-2, Ex. B.)
On the 602 inmate appeal form, in appeal number CCI-0-11-00465, Plaintiff referenced the following documents in support of his grievance: 128-G dated 8-20-08, 3-11-09, 5-5-10, 11-24-10 and 12-15-10. (
Plaintiff contends that in this appeal he refers to five separate classification actions involving many staff members. (ECF No. 74, Opp'n at 4.) Plaintiff submits that he provided sufficient information, notwithstanding the space and page limitation, to describe the issues of the appeal, the corresponding dates and times, as well as the identify the respective title/position of each involved staff member. Specifically, section F of the appeal states, "CCI Classification Committee Members" as those individuals involved and the supporting documents referenced in the appeal identified each staff member involved by name, title, and respective signature.
Defendants counter that Plaintiff acknowledged the regulations that require him to list all staff members involved in the incident and describe their involvement. Plaintiff failed to identify and describe each Defendants involvement, and Plaintiff did not complain that he could not identify a Defendant or describe their actions because of limited space. When interviewed about the grievance, Plaintiff also failed to identify Defendants and describe their actions or provide that he had more information relating to the appeal that could not be set forth on the limited space of the grievance form.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on November 24, 2010, Defendants Croxton, Schulteis, McLaughlin, Liles, Carrasco, Snider, Drake, Holland, and Walker willingly and knowingly retained [him] in continuous SHU placement under the pretext that Plaintiff's case was deferred to the Departmental Review Board (DRB) for future SHU placement consideration, effectively and officially relinquishing any and all authority to release Plaintiff from the SHU. (Compl. at 10.) Subsequent to a discussion between Defendant, Correctional Counselor Pierce and members of the Classification Service Unit on or about November 24, 2010, Defendant Pierce informed Plaintiff that Defendants never submitted his case to the DRB for review and/or consideration, resulting in periodic review amounting to more than a meaningful gesture. (
An appeal "suffices to exhaust a claim if it puts the prison on adequate notice of the problem for which the prisoner seeks redress," and "the prisoner need only provide the level of detail required by the prison's regulations."
The only issue sufficiently grieved in inmate appeal number CCI-0-11-00465 is Plaintiff's claim that he was retained in the SHU without appropriate review by the DRB following the November 24, 2010, hearing. The more difficult question is which, if any, Defendants were exhausted by way of this appeal. This grievance is sufficient to exhaust Plaintiff's claim against Defendants Pierce and Holland, the only Defendants identified as classification members of the November 24, 2010, hearing for which Plaintiff seeks liability relevant to this claim.
This grievance does not grieve Plaintiff's subsequent due process claim that on November 24, 2010 and December 15, 2010, Defendants Pierce, Holland, Miner, and Walker knowingly retained him in the SHU based on information they knew to be false and/or sensationalized. This claim as presented in the complaint is based on the use of false information, including his use of a weapon during the hostage incident of April 2000, escape history, sexual battery of staff during the hostage incident, escape plots, and bomb-making prints. (Compl. at 10.) There is no mention in appeal number CCI-0-11-00465 of any the above referenced factors that were "falsely" used to retain Plaintiff in the SHU, and this appeal did not suffice to place prison officials on nature as to the specific issue of Plaintiff's claim. The regulations in effect in 2011 required notice of the "specific issues," and Plaintiff's appeal number CCI-0-11-00465 did not suffice to provide notice as to the issues underlying his due process claim involving use of false and/or sensationalized information to retain him in the SHU. Plaintiff's claim that he grieved five separate classification actions is not persuasive. A plain reading of the appeal reveals that Plaintiff challenged only that his case was never submitted to the DRB for review in accordance to the CDCR 128-G dated November 24, 2010. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not exhaust his due process claim that on November 24, 2010, and December 15, 2010, Defendants Pierce, Holland, Miner, and Walker willingly and knowingly retained Catanzarite on indeterminate SHU status based on information they clearly knew to be false and/or sensationalized, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56;
Defendants' claim that this appeal was untimely and cannot challenge the November 2010 hearing is not persuasive. Defendants argue that by waiting until March 22, 2011 to submit this appeal, Plaintiff violated CDCR's procedural rule requiring submission of his inmate appeal within thirty calendar days of the November 24, 2010 event described in the complaint. Defendants cite
Accordingly, the Court finds appeal number CCI-0-11-00465, sufficiently exhausted Plaintiff's due process claim against relating to the November 24, 2010, hearing and failure to obtain DRB review as to Defendants Pierce and Holland.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on February 1, 2012, during the classification hearing Defendants Pierce, Walker, and Marshall willingly and knowingly violated Plaintiff's right to due process and meaningful review by 1) refusing Plaintiff the right to present evidence; 2) refusing to disclose the case factors and/or circumstantial considerations employed to justify indeterminate SHU placement, and 3) employing information they clearly knew to be false, sensationalized, and stale. (Compl. at 23-24.) Plaintiff further alleges that:
(
In appeal number CCI-0-12-00346, Plaintiff grieved the following:
(ECF No. 69-3, Ex. C.)
On the 602 inmate appeal form, in appeal number CCI-0-12-00346, Plaintiff referenced the following documents in support of his complaint: 128-G dated 6-22-11 and 2-1-12; first level response to CDC 22 dated 10-19-11; CDC 1030 dated 1-25-06; English and Dutch version of the so-called "manifesto" for a total of 12 documents. (
This appeal was bypassed at the first level of review and denied at the second and third levels of review. (
Defendants argue this appeal does not exhaust any claims against Defendant Carrasco, Croxton, Drake, Gassaway, Gonzalez, Holland, Liles, McLaughlin, Miner, Nipper, Reed, Rouston, Schulteis, Snider, or Steadman because they are not named or otherwise identified in the appeal, and no conduct by them is described in the appeal. Defendants further argue that this appeal is insufficient to exhaust Plaintiff's claims that he was denied the right to present evidence, or that the committee refused to disclose the case factors or circumstantial considerations employed to justify his indeterminate-security-housing-unit placement since none of those allegations are raised in the appeal. However, Defendants acknowledge this appeal, at most, exhausts the claims against Defendants Marshall, Pierce, and Walker for using "stale" or "false" evidence to retain him in the security housing unit.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that given the page restriction on inmate appeals, he was limited as to what information could be provided. Plaintiff contends this appeal exhausted his claim that he was not permitted to submit evidence at his February 1, 2012, Institutional Classification Committee hearing. Plaintiff further contends that points to section F of the appeal in which he argues that he tried to present evidence during the committee hearing but was prevented from doing so.
The Court finds appeal number CCI-0-12-00346, sufficiently exhausted Plaintiff's due process claims against Defendants Marshall, Pierce, and Walker. There was sufficient factual allegations contained on the 602 appeal form and accompanying supporting documentation to place prison officials on notice of an alleged due process violation took place at the February 1, 2012, review hearing conducted by Defendants Marshall, Pierce, and Walker. (ECF No. 69-3, Ex. C.)
However, this appeal did not grieve that Plaintiff was refused the right to present evidence, or that the Defendants refused to disclose the case factors or circumstantial considerations employed to justify indeterminate-security-housing-unit placement. Indeed, the relief requested in this appeal was for a near hearing at which the "stale" factors would not be considered, and an investigations into the legitimacy of the factors used by the committee at the February 1, 2012, committee. (ECF No. 69-3, Ex. C.) Further, there is no support either factually or by identification of name or title as to Defendants Croxton, Drake, Gassaway, Gonzalez, Holland, Liles, McLaughlin, Miner, Nipper, Reed, Rouston, Schulteis, Snider, or Steadman and there is no basis to find prison officials were placed on notice of any alleged wrongdoing by these individuals. Plaintiff's claim that he presented his due process claim relating to the inability to present evidence at the classification hearing in his request for third level review does not serve to exhaust such claim. The addition of Plaintiff's due process claim based on the inability to present certain evidence at his February 1, 2012, classification hearing at his request for third level review did not exhaust such retaliation claim because new claims are not permitted as the appeal moves through the levels of review.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that "CDC appeal dated 7-18-11 was rejected on several occasions during screening. On 9-29-11, appeals cancelled the same, effectively exhausting all `available' administrative remedies." (Compl. at 4.)
Defendants submit that Plaintiff's appeal was screened out and eventually cancelled for Plaintiff's failure to follow CDCR procedural rules and the instructions of the prison's Inmate Appeals Coordinator. (ECF No. 69, Decl. of Wood, Ex. D.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff's failure to comply with CDCR regulations, and his failure to obtain a Director's level appeal decision on his screened-out appeal means that it is ineffective to exhaust any claims in this suit.
Plaintiff contends that he continuously followed the instructions provided upon rejection of the grievance and re-submitted the grievance several times and each time it was rejected for a similar or different reason.
Plaintiff's claim that because his appeals were cancelled he effectively exhausted, is without merit. Defendants submit each of the rejection letters dated July 25, 2011, August 1, 2011, August 25, 2011, September 2, 2011, and September 29, 2011, which sets forth the reasons the grievance was screened-out and returned to Plaintiff for resubmission. (Decl. of Wood, Ex. D.) In response to such letters, Plaintiff either failed to correct the deficiency and/or created a new deficiency in the resubmitted grievance. Either way, Plaintiff failed to exhaust any claims by way of this grievance because it is impossible to know whether the appeal had any relevance to the claims raised or the Defendants named in this lawsuit because it was never properly submitted for review. Plaintiff's claim that the September 21, 2011, letter did not provide a reason for the cancellation is without merit. The September 29, 2011, letter specifically stated that the appeal was cancelled because Plaintiff continued "to submit a rejected appeal while disregarding appeal staff's previous instructions to correct the appeal. Additionally, the CDC 695 form dated 4/18/11 predates the date of the appeal, 7/18/11 and is not a party of this appeal, nor is it for the same category." (Decl. of Wood, Ex. D at 6.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief that the Court order he be released from California Correctional Institution security housing unit should be denied because Plaintiff is no longer housed at the California Correctional Institute or in the security housing unit.
Defendants are correct. Prospective relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). The Court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the Court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.
Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within
