STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendants, by and through each counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 25, 2015.

2. By this stipulation, the defendant NEMESSIS VENEGAS only now moves to continue the status conference until July 9, 2015, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude the time period between the date of this stipulation, June 22, 2015, and the proposed new status conference hearing date, July 9, 2015, from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find and order the following:

a. The government initially provided 32 pages of investigative reports. These reports show that there are additional audio and video recordings and other evidence available for inspection and copying. The government has committed a plea agreement to writing. Counsel for Defendant Venegas needs additional time to discuss the offer. Additionally, Mr. Venegas lives in Southern California and was in an automobile accident. He was uninjured, but his car is not drivable and he has incurred significant costs recently that would make travel to Sacramento extremely difficult.

b. Counsel for the defendant VENEGAS also desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolution his client, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

c. Counsel for defendant VENEGAS believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period from the date of this stipulation, June 22, 2015, to and including the date of the proposed new status conference, July 9, 2015, shall be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and B(iv) and Local Code T4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

UPON GOOD CAUSE SHOWN and the stipulation of all parties, it is ordered that the June 25, 2015, status conference hearing for NEMESSIS VENEGAS only be continued to July 9, 2015, at 9:30 a.m. Based on the representation of defense counsel and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court hereby finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. It is ordered that time beginning from the parties' stipulation, June 22, 2015, up to and including the July 9, 2015, status conference shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T-4, to allow defense counsel reasonable time to prepare.

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.