Filed: Jul. 16, 2015
Latest Update: Jul. 16, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 28, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until September 15, 2015, and to exclude time between July 28, 2015, and September 15, 2015, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The gov
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 28, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until September 15, 2015, and to exclude time between July 28, 2015, and September 15, 2015, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The gove..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 28, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until September 15, 2015, and to exclude time between July 28, 2015, and September 15, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes transcripts, audio, and reports related to two wiretaps and reports and audio/video from several controlled drug transactions. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review the discovery, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 28, 2015 to September 15, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
