SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Timothy Watts ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 17, 2013. This action for damages is proceeding against Defendants Nguyen and Rouch for retaliation, in violation of the First Amendment, and against Defendants Nguyen, Rouch, Nareddy, Beregovskays, and Macias for denial of adequate medical care, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
On October 21, 2014, Defendants Nguyen, Rouch, Nareddy, Beregovskays, and Macias ("Defendants") filed a motion for summary judgment based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust the available administrative remedies in compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 403 (2014). (Doc. 24.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on December 18, 2014, and the motion was submitted on the record without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(l).
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This statutory exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983 (2002) (quotation marks omitted), regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner or the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001), and unexhausted claims may not be brought to court, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211, 127 S.Ct. 910 (2007) (citing Porter, 534 U.S. at 524).
The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and the defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. "In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)." Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. Otherwise, the defendants must produce evidence proving the failure to exhaust, and they are entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows he failed to exhaust. Id.
Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166; Washington Mut. Inc. v. U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party's position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, although it is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).
The defendants bear the burden of proof in moving for summary judgment for failure to exhaust, Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166, and they must "prove that there was an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy," id. at 1172. If the defendants carry their burden, the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff "to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him." Id. This requires the plaintiff to "show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence." In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986)). "If the undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56." Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. However, "[i]f material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts." Id.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he has had seven failed knee surgeries and doctors have ordered that he not be transferred to any prison with a cold climate. On May 21, 2012, Plaintiff was transferred to California State Prison-Corcoran, and he informed Defendants Nguyen, Nareddy, Beregovskays, Macias, and Rouch about his numerous failed knee surgeries and the severe, chronic pain caused by his degenerative condition. Plaintiff alleges that for more than a year, he filed medical requests seeking to be seen by Defendants Nguyen, Nareddy, and Rouch because his knees were swollen every day and he was in constant pain. Plaintiff alleges Defendants told him that although they could see the swelling and could imagine he must be in serious pain, they would not reorder his walking cane or pain medication because security staff had concerns about potential weapons and misuse of drugs. Plaintiff told them they should be more concerned about the probability of his further injury without the aid of a cane, hinged knee braces, and orthotic boots. Defendants admitted that they were and that Plaintiff should have those aids, but said security staff, who "write [Defendants'] checks," did not want Defendants stepping on their toes. (Doc. 1, Compl., ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Nguyen, Nareddy, and Rouch admitted that they were willing to make Plaintiff face further injury in the absence of necessary medical aids and live with severe, constant pain just to appease security staff. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Nguyen and Rouch began threatening him with no medical care if he continued filing grievances and complaining so much. Plaintiff sought a transfer to another prison if he was not going to get appropriate medical care at CSP-Corcoran, but Defendants told him he was not hearing them and security staff made those decisions.
Plaintiff alleges that he addressed these issues in his prison grievance, and Defendants Beregovskays and Macias "spoke of" them in their response, but he had to "wrestle" with them just to get a lower bunk chrono. (Id., ¶5.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were aware of his medical needs but allowed security staff to dictate his care.
Plaintiff is a state prisoner in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR"), and CDCR has an administrative remedy process for inmate grievances. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.1 (2014). Compliance with section 1997e(a) is mandatory and state prisoners are required to exhaust CDCR's administrative remedy process prior to filing suit in federal court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85-86, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006); Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2010). The administrative remedy process is initiated by submitting a CDCR Form 602 "Inmate/Parolee Appeal" within thirty calendar days (1) of the event or decision being appealed, (2) upon first having knowledge of the action or decision being appealed, or (3) upon receiving an unsatisfactory departmental response to an appeal filed. Tit. 15, §§ 3084.2(a), 3084.8(b)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The appeal must "describe the specific issue under appeal and the relief requested," and the inmate "shall list all staff member(s) involved and shall describe their involvement in the issue." Tit. 15, § 3084.2(a). Furthermore, the inmate "shall state all facts known and available to him/her regarding the issue being appealed at the time of submitting the Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form, and if needed, the Inmate Parolee/Appeal Form Attachment." Tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(4).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff conflates the exhaustion requirement set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) with what is commonly known as the "three strikes" provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Focusing on the words "unless the prisoner is in imminent danger of serious physical injury," Plaintiff argues that he filed this action pursuant to the imminent danger provision and he had no other choice. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The apparent argument that section 1915(g) provides an exception to the exhaustion requirement has no merit, however, as they are separate statutes.
28 U.S.C. § 1915 is the in forma pauperis statute and subsection (g) of that statute procedurally bars prisoners from proceeding in forma pauperis if they have had three or more actions or appeals dismissed for failure to state a claim, frivolousness, or maliciousness. An exception to this procedural bar is available if, at the time the complaint is filed, "the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury." § 1915(g); Coleman v. Tollefson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 1759, 1761-62 (2015); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052-55 (9th Cir. 2007). Section 1997e(a), on the other hand, sets forth a separate and distinct exhaustion requirement, and it provides no exceptions for imminent danger or any other reason. As recognized by the Supreme Court in 2002, "[a]ll `available' remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be `plain, speedy, and effective.'" Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 739 n.5).
In addition, threaded throughout Plaintiff's opposition brief are arguments concerning prison officials' failure to follow their own regulations. Plaintiff asserts that prison officials do not follow the regulatory time constraints and if inmates fail to inquire about the status in writing, the appeals are not returned; and that prison officials have a practice of "stagnating and stifling" appeals. (Doc., 31, Opp., 3:17.) While this Circuit has recognized there are exceptions to the exhaustion requirement where the available appeals process is rendered unavailable, general arguments regarding non-specific appeals do not suffice to invoke any such exceptions. E.g., McBride v. Lopez, ___ F.3d ___, ___, No. 12-17682, 2015 WL 3953483, at *___ (9th Cir. Jun. 30, 2015); Sapp, 623 F.3d at 822-24. If Defendants meet their initial burden, Plaintiff must address whether he exhausted his claims and this requires he come forth with specific factual evidence regarding the steps he took to exhaust. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171-72. Plaintiff has addressed specific inmate appeals in this case and those appeals will be addressed in the sections that follow. The Court acknowledges these general, unavailing arguments at the outset so as to ensure the record is clear that the arguments were considered.
The parties are in agreement regarding the three relevant inmate appeals, and therefore, the Court omits from discussion the substantively irrelevant appeals identified and addressed by Defendants in their motion. (Doc. 24-2, Motion, §§ III, IV; Doc. 31, Opp., 3:5, 3:14, 4:17-20, 5:13-6:5, 7:26-8:9.) The Court finds that Defendants met their initial burden with respect to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust CDCR's generally available administrative remedy process prior to filing this lawsuit; and for the reasons which follow, it finds that Plaintiff neither exhausted nor demonstrated that the remedy process was rendered effectively unavailable, entitling Defendants to judgment. Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191; Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171-72.
On July 17, 2012, Plaintiff submitted appeal number COR HC 12050979 to the first level of review. Tit. 15, §§ 3084.7(a), 3084.8(b). The appeal provided as follows:
(Doc. 24-5, Motion, Robinson Decl., Ex. B, pp. 19 & 21 (emphasis in original).)
On August 30, 2012, Plaintiff submitted his appeal to the second level of review after it was denied at the first level. Tit. 15, §§ 3084.7(b), 3084.8(b). At that time, he stated, in relevant part, "On 7-25-12, during a grievance (602) hearing with
Finally, on October 18, 2012, Plaintiff submitted his appeal to the third level of review after it was denied at the second level. Tit. 15, §§ 3084.7(c), 3084.8(b). He stated, in relevant part, "Corcoran Medical staff is interfering with already prescribed treatment, and in doing so, subjecting me to unnecessary pain & suffering. Dr. Karan M.D. who is making every effort to appease security staff, rather than medically sound decision's [sic] that would minimize my pain." (Id.)
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he filed a grievance concerning the facts of his complaint and the grievance process was completed on March 15, 2013. (Doc. 1, Compl., p. 3.) Attached to Plaintiff's complaint is a copy of the appeal, tracking/log number COR HC 12050979, described above. (Id., Ex. D, p. 49-51.) This is the same appeal Plaintiff argues in his opposition exhausted his claims. (Doc. 31, Opp., 7:26-8:12.)
In their motion, Defendants argue that although appeal number COR HC 12050979 addressed some of the issues in this lawsuit, it did not exhaust Plaintiff's claims because it neither named the Defendants, in compliance with section 3084.2(a)(3), nor attributed any denial of a cane and orthopedic boots to medical staff. (Doc. 24-2, Motion, 9:18-10:6.) Rather, the appeal blamed custody staff for misplacing the items, in addition to grieving the co-pays Plaintiff was charged. Defendants contend that Plaintiff subsequently added new issues, in contravention of the regulations, but even so, he named a non-party physician as the culpable individual. (Id., 10:6-10.)
In response, Plaintiff argues that appeal number COR HC 12050979 "speaks to the issues of Plaintiff's civil action, and (co-payment) cane, orthopedic boots, the need for hinged knee braces, physical therapy," and it "speaks at length about Plaintiff's medical care and condition, prescribed medical appliance that Plaintiff did not receive & co-pay." (Doc. 31, Opp., 8:1-7.) Plaintiff contends that the appeal was exhausted before he filed suit, and because he exhausted an appeal that outlines the issues in this case, "he need not exhaust another one" and Defendants' motion must be denied. (Id., 8:8-9 & 8:18-20.)
Exhaustion requirements are designed to deal with parties who do not want to exhaust and who would prefer not to give the agency a fair and full opportunity to adjudicate their claims. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 (quotation marks omitted). For this reason, proper procedural and substantive exhaustion of administrative remedies is required, which demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90; Wilkerson, 772 F.3d at 839. Prisoners are required to "use all the steps the prison holds out, enabling the prison to reach the merits of the issue," Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90).
Relevant here, the applicable prison regulations provide that inmates must list all involved staff members and describe their involvement; and inmates shall state all facts known regarding the issue being appealed. Tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3), (4). In addition, the regulations provide that "[a]dministrative remedies shall not be considered exhausted relative to any new issue, information, or person later named by the appellant that was not included in the originally submitted CDCR Form 602 (Rev. 08/09), Inmate/Parolee Appeal. . . ." Tit. 15, § 3084.1(b).
The Ninth Circuit previously adopted the Strong standard as "the standard of factual specificity required when a prison's grievance procedures do not specify the requisite level of detail," Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120 (adopting standard articulated in Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002)), and it applied that standard to California's state prison regulations in 2009, holding that an appeal "suffices to exhaust a claim if it puts the prison on adequate notice of the problem for which the prisoner seeks redress." Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824 (citing Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, California's prison regulations were amended in December 2010 and Sapp involved the previous, now-superceded regulations, Sapp, 623 F.3d at 819 (2002 inmate appeals), as did subsequent Ninth Circuit cases applying the Strong standard to California's regulations, Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2014); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2012); McCollum v. California Dep't of Corrs. & Rehab., 647 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2011); see Parks v. Chappell, No. C-13-4048 EMC (pr), 2015 WL 3466280, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Jun. 1, 2015) (recognizing that Strong standard cases are distinguishable because they address the prior regulations). At that time, the regulations required only a description of the problem and the action requested. Plaintiff's appeal would have sufficed to exhaust the claims at issue in this action under that version of the regulations, but his appeal was submitted in July 2012 and it is subject to the current regulations.
The exhaustion requirement was enacted "to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits; to this purpose, Congress afforded corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case." Porter, 534 U.S. at 524-25; Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 2014); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-1201 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Thus, "[t]he primary purpose of a grievance is to alert the prison to a problem and facilitate its resolution, not to lay groundwork for litigation." Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120; see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 219 (promotion of early notice to those who might later be sued not thought to be one of the leading purposes of exhaustion requirement) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004)). However, as recognized by both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, "[t]he scope of [procedural and substantive exhaustion] depends on the scope of administrative remedies that the state provides," Wilkerson, 772 F.3d at 839 (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 218), and the inquiry is now guided by more specific regulations than those at issue in Sapp and the cases that followed.
The Court finds that Plaintiff's appeal failed to comply with current prison regulations in two respects. First, Plaintiff added new issues after he submitted the appeal, which is in direct contravention of the regulations. Tit. 15, § 3084.1(b). The appeal as originally submitted concerned the allegedly wrongful assessment of co-payments and the misplacement of Plaintiff's cane and orthotic boots by custody staff; it provided no notice regarding misconduct by medical staff with respect to his medical need for appliances. Moreover, at no level did the appeal provide notice regarding any retaliatory conduct.
Second, in adding new issues at the second level of review, Plaintiff specifically identified non-party Dr. Karan as the culpable staff member who improperly deferred to custody staff despite acknowledging Plaintiff's condition. Plaintiff again identified Dr. Karan in his third level appeal. To the extent an argument may be made that prison officials' substantive consideration of issues newly raised at the second or third level of review waives any subsequent procedural objection by them,
Next, Plaintiff submitted appeal number COR HC 12051824 on October 25, 2012. Plaintiff sought a CT scan and to have his knee braces chrono renewed. In his first level appeal, Plaintiff stated:
(Doc. 24-5, Motion, Robinson Decl., Ex. D, pp. 58 & 60.)
At the second level of review, Plaintiff added staff member Defendant Rouch to the appeal, stating:
(Id., pp. 57 & 59.)
Defendants argue that this appeal does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement because Plaintiff filed suit prematurely. Defendants contend that the third level response was due on June 14, 2013, and Plaintiff filed suit prematurely on June 11, 2013. See Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying mailbox rule, under which the time of filing is the time the prisoner delivers his filing to prison officials for forwarding to the clerk, to section 1983 cases).
Plaintiff argues that prison officials impermissibly "gave themselves" sixty days to respond to his appeal at the first and second levels of review, all the while he continued to suffer pain and worsening health. (Doc. 31, Opp., 5:22-28.) Plaintiff therefore availed himself of the "imminent danger" exception. (Id., 5:28-6:5.)
Plaintiff's misapplication of the imminent danger exception was addressed and rejected in section III(C), and his assertion that prison officials failed to comply with time constraints at the first and second levels of review is not borne out by the evidence. Time limits for completion of appeals commence upon receipt of the appeal by the appeals coordinator, tit. 15, § 3084.6 (a), and the first and second level responses are due "within 30 working days from date of receipt by the appeals coordinator," tit. 15, § 3084.8(c)(1), (2). Third level responses are due "within 60 working days from the date of receipt by the third level Appeals Chief." Tit. 15, § 3084.8(c)(3). "`Working day' means a calendar day excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and official state holidays." Tit. 15, § 4003(j)(2).
The evidence submitted shows that the first and second level responses were timely issued within thirty working days from the date of receipt by the appeals coordinators, and Plaintiff's appeal was subsequently received at the third level of review on March 21, 2013.
Plaintiff may not avail himself of the argument that prison officials rendered the process effectively unavailable by failing to comply with the applicable regulations when he failed to comply with them in the first instance by filing suit prematurely; any breach of the regulations by prison officials occurred after he brought suit. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1200. As a general principle, procedural rules must be adhered to by both inmates and prison officials, but here, Plaintiff filed suit prior to prison officials' response deadline and the fact that they subsequently failed to deliver a timely response cannot be relied upon to save what was a prematurely filed lawsuit. In light of the fact that Plaintiff filed suit prematurely, the Court does not reach either the issue of Plaintiff's inclusion of Defendant Rouch for the first time at the second level of review or a determination regarding the effect, if any, of prison officials' failure to timely decide Plaintiff's appeal at the third level of review.
Finally, on April 22, 2013, Plaintiff submitted an appeal on a "Reasonable Modification or Accommodation" form, which was assigned number TLR# 1300988/COR-13-02737 ADA/CSPC-6-13-02737 ("CSPC-6-13-02737"). (Doc. 24-4, Motion, Briggs Decl., Ex. C, p. 44.) The appeal addressed Plaintiff's knee pain; the confiscation of his cane; medical staff's refusal to order him pain medication, a cane, hinged knee braces, or orthotic boots because custody staff does not like it; and Defendants Nareddy, Nguyen, and Rouch's acknowledgement of his pain and refusal to renew pain medication, a cane, knee braces, or orthotics because of custody staff. (Id.)
Defendants argue that Defendants Beregovskays and Macias are not mentioned in the appeal, and that the appeal does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement with respect to Defendants Nareddy, Nguyen, and Rouch because Plaintiff filed suit prior to exhausting the appeal.
In response, Plaintiff argues that he exhausted numerous appeals, including this one; and that the appeal evidences prison officials' practice of "stagnating and stifling appeal's [sic]." (Doc. 31, Opp., 4:17-21.) Plaintiff points out that the appeal went through the first and second levels of review before it was sent back by the third level of review because it contained claims against custody and medical staff, despite the absence of any such disallowance in the regulations. (Id., 4:22-25.)
The evidence submitted shows the appeal was received by the appeals office on April 25, 2013. (Doc. 24-4, Motion, Ex. C, p. 44.) The appeal coordinator's first level response was due on June 7, 2013; and the evidence shows the appeal was denied on June 3, 2013, and returned to Plaintiff on June 6, 2013. Tit. 15, § 3084.8(c)(1). (Doc. 24-4, Motion, Ex. C, pp. 45, 52-53.) Plaintiff was required to pursue the appeal to the next level of review, Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681, 683-84 (9th Cir. 2010), and he timely submitted the appeal to the second level of review on June 12, 2013. Tit. 15, § 3084.8(d)(3). (Ex. C, pp. 46-47.)
Although Plaintiff argues generally that prison officials routinely violate their own regulations while demanding strict compliance by inmates, his arguments again lack merit with respect to this specific appeal. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1200. Regardless of whether the subsequent third level rejection was proper or not, see Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824-26 (improper rejection of appeal renders process effectively unavailable), the first level denial was timely and instead of pursuing completion of the grievance process before filing suit, Plaintiff simultaneously pursued his appeal to the second level of review and filed suit, see Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824-26 (available administrative remedies must be exhausted); Ellis v. Cambra, No. 1:02-cv-05646-AWI-SMS P, 2005 WL 2105039, at *5 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 30, 2005) (citing Porter, 534 U.S. at 524) ("[I]f there is a process available, it must be utilized, regardless of how tiresome or trying."). Accordingly, based on Plaintiff's premature initiation of suit, this appeal does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement with respect to claims in this action. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1200.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies as to his claims in this action. With respect to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment medical care claims, Plaintiff's first appeal, number COR HC 12050979 submitted on July 17, 2012, was exhausted before he filed suit, but because he failed to comply with the applicable prison regulations, the appeal did not suffice to exhaust his claims against the defendants in this action. Regarding Plaintiff's second appeal, number COR HC 12051824 submitted on October 25, 2012, Plaintiff filed suit prematurely, before the time expired for prison officials to render a third level decision. Plaintiff also filed suit prematurely concerning his third appeal, number CSPC-6-13-02737 submitted on April 22, 2013.
Finally, with respect to Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim, none of these appeals grieved that issue and would not have sufficed to exhaust the claim, notwithstanding the existence of other deficiencies addressed herein. While Plaintiff is not precluded from pursuing redress in a new lawsuit regarding claims exhausted after he initiated filed this action, he may not continue with this action given his failure to exhaust his claims against Defendants prior to filing suit.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion for summary judgment, filed on October 21, 2014, be GRANTED and judgment be entered in their favor, thus concluding this action in its entirety.
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within
