STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, GILBERT ARREAZOLA alone, by and through his respective counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 24, 2015.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until October 22, 2015, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between September 24, 2015, and October 22, 2015, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has produced discovery associated with this case. There are, to date, 292 pages of written or photographic material and 9 compact disks of recorded audio materials. In addition, the parties are close to resolution, having been actively engaged in plea negotiations.

b. Counsel for defendants request additional time to review discovery, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to further discuss potential resolutions with his client, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

c. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period between the date of the parties' stipulation, September 24, 2015 and the new status conference on October 22, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the time period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. Based on the representation of the parties and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court hereby finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. It is ordered that time beginning from the parties' stipulation on September 21, 2015up to and including the October 22, 2015, status conference shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (7) (A) and (B) (iv) and Local Code T 4, to allow defense counsel reasonable time to prepare.

IT IS SO ORDERED.