MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
Defendant, JESSE DAVENPORT, in pro per, and the United States by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby stipulate and request that the due date for defendant's reply to the government's opposition to his motion to suppress evidence be extended by two weeks and the motion briefing schedule be modified as follows:
A continuance is necessary to allow the defendant additional time to respond to the government's opposition.
The parties further stipulate that the failure to grant a continuance in this matter would deny defendant reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence; that the ends of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial; and that time should be excluded from the computation of time within which trial must commence under the Speedy Trial Act from September 24, 2015, up to and including November 5, 2015, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 (h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), Local Code T-4, to allow defense counsel reasonable time to prepare and 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(1)(D) and Local Code E, delay resulting from pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusions of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.
I, JESSE DAVENPORT, the filing party, have received authorization from AUSA Andre Espinosa to sign and submit this stipulation and proposed order on his behalf.
Accordingly, the defendant and the United States agree that the due date for defendant's reply to the government's opposition to his motion to suppress evidence be extended by two weeks to Friday, October 9, 2015.
The due date for defendant's reply to the government's opposition to his motion to suppress evidence is extended by two weeks and the motion briefing schedule is modified as follows:
The Court finds that the failure to grant such a continuance would deny counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. Accordingly, the time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act is excluded from September 24, 2015, up to and including the date of the motion hearing, November 5, 2015, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 (h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), Local Code T-4, to allow defense counsel reasonable time to prepare and 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(1)(D) and Local Code E, delay resulting from pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusions of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion. The Court specifically finds that the ends of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendants in a speedy trial within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (7) (A) and (B) (IV) and Local Code T-4.
