STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

KIMBERLY J. MUELLER, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, proceeding pro se, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. On September 5, 2014, the parties in this case submitted a stipulation and proposed order to exclude time under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) and Local Code T4 on grounds that all defendants needed additional time to prepare for trial, and that the ends of justice served by continuing the case to October 1, 2014 outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. See ECF No. 94. The stipulation was signed by all counsel, including defendant John Kash's counsel of record at the time, Mark Reichel. At the time, none of the defendants had been severed.

2. In the stipulation, the parties set forth very specific reasons justifying the continuance and the exclusion of time. They explained that they needed additional time to review discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses.

3. On September 8, 2014, the Court, by minute order, granted the request for a continuance "in light of the time needed for defense preparation." ECF No. 95. Despite the Court's granting the continuance for the reasons stated by the parties, the minute order did not specifically reflect an exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act.

4. The parties agree that it was everyone's intention to exclude time, as evidenced by the stipulation, and that the reasons for such an exclusion were clear at the time that the request was made and granted.

5. The parties jointly request a clarification of the September 8, 2014 minute order to include a specific finding that time between September 10, 2014 and October 1, 2014 was excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it resulted from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

The Court hereby clarifies its minute order of September 8, 2014, which granted a continuance based on the parties' detailed September 5, 2014 stipulation. That stipulation explained that the defense needed more time to review discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses. The stipulation also included a proposed order and finding to exclude time between September 10, 2014 and October 1, 2014, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

The Court did, in fact, grant the continuance for those reasons, as reflected in the minute order. To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the September 8, 2014 minute order, the Court hereby clarifies that it did intend, at that time, to make the specific finding that time between September 10, 2014 and October 1, 2014 be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. See United States v. Hickey, 580 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir. 2009) (permitting later clarifications of exclusions of time and providing that simultaneous "ends of justice" findings are unnecessary so long as the trial court later shows that the delay was motivated by proper considerations).

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.