MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.

Through this action, Plaintiffs Linnie Staggs, as administrator of the Estate of Robert E. Staggs, and Melissa Staggs (collectively, "Plaintiffs") seek redress from defendant Doctor's Hospital of Manteca, Inc. ("DHM"), and a number of individual defendants regarding the medical treatment and subsequent death of Robert E. Staggs ("Decedent") while in custody at the Sierra Conservation Center ("SCC"). Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 102) and Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Third Amended Complaint ("ATAC") by Defendants Sattah, DHM and Benak.1

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend ("Motion"). As a result, the Motions to Dismiss are DENIED as moot.2

BACKGROUND

In their ATAC, Plaintiffs allege causes of action for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, violation of California Government Code section 845.6, negligence, violation of California Civil Code section 2.1, and wrongful death. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that various medical officials at SCC and DHM were deliberately indifferent and negligent in diagnosing and treating Decedent's multiple liver diseases. They aver that Defendants' decision to subject Decedent to a risky biopsy procedure resulted in excruciating pain and suffering and, ultimately, Decedent's untimely death.

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs' First and Fifth Claims for Relief for violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for failure to state a claim. In doing so, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. ECF No. 88. On appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the dismissal of Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief, finding that it properly stated a claim that Defendants St. Clair, Bangi, Krpan and Benak were deliberately indifferent to Decedent's right to adequate and necessary healthcare. ECF No. 94.

Shortly after the Court re-opened this action, Defendants filed their instant Motions to Dismiss and Plaintiffs filed their current Motion to Amend, all of which were timely opposed. Plaintiffs' proposed Fourth Amended Complaint seeks to include new claims under § 1983 on behalf of Plaintiffs, in their individual capacities, for deprivations of Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to familial association with Decedent, as well as the loss of companionship they suffered as a result of Decedent's death. Furthermore, Plaintiffs seek to add § 1983 claims against Defendants Sattah and DHM for their deliberate indifference to Decedent's serious medical needs. The Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint also omits one sentence from the previous complaint regarding general rates of survival for individuals afflicted with one of Decedent's medical conditions.

STANDARD

Generally, a motion for leave to amend a pleading is subject to Rule 15(a), which provides that "[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts interpret Rule 15(a) with "extreme liberality." Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit applies this liberal policy of amendment of pleadings so long as the case management scheduling order setting the deadline for amendment of pleadings has not passed. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000). If the movant articulates a reason why amendment is needed, the "burden then shifts to the opposing party to persuade the court that `justice' requires denial." Stoddart v. Express Services, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-01054, 2015 WL 1812833 at *2 (E.D. Cal. April 20, 2015).

In exercising its discretion to permit or deny a party to amend its pleading, Ninth Circuit courts consider five factors: (1) whether the amendment was filed with undue delay; (2) whether the movant has requested the amendment in bad faith or as a dilatory tactic; (3) whether the movant was allowed to make previous amendments which failed to correct deficiencies of the complaint; (4) whether the amendment will unduly prejudice the opposing party; and (5) whether the amendment would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Whether amendment will unduly prejudice the opposing party is the most important factor in a court's analysis under Rule 15(a). Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs argue that they need to amend their complaint to include additional claims under § 1983 and add a new claim for loss of companionship. They also seek to omit a paragraph from the ATAC concerning the general survival rate of patients with one of Decedent's medical conditions. Since Plaintiffs have articulated a reason why amendment is needed, Defendants must persuade the Court that justice requires denial of Plaintiffs' Motion. Stoddart v. Express Services, Inc., 2015 WL 1812833 at *2. To that end, Defendants principally argue that the Foman factors of prejudice, futility and undue delay militate in favor of denying Plaintiffs' Motion. Setting the Foman factors aside, Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs should not be permitted to amend the ATAC to remove allegations about the survival rate of patients with one of Decedent's medical conditions. As explained below, Defendants' arguments are unpersuasive.

A. The Foman Analysis

DHM and Dr. Sattah argue that they would be prejudiced by the proposed amendments because of stipulations that the § 1983 claims alleged in previous complaints did not apply to them and because the events that engendered those claims occurred nearly six years ago. Defendants' arguments are not well-taken.

Ninth Circuit courts have found undue prejudice where the "parties have engaged in voluminous and protracted discovery prior to amendment" and where filing an amended complaint would have led to "the nullification of prior discovery, increase the burden of necessary future discovery," or required the relitigation of a previous suit. Utterkar v. Ebix, 14-CV-02250, 2015 WL 5027986 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2015). Defendants do not and cannot point to any of these potentially deleterious effects in opposing the instant Motion. The parties have not yet engaged in any discovery. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' proposed § 1983 claims depend upon essentially the same alleged conduct as the negligence claims previously asserted against Dr. Sattah and DHM. There is thus no risk that amendment would substantially increase the burden of necessary future discovery or that Defendants will be prejudiced in their ability to defend against these allegations. See id.

Finally as to undue prejudice, although it is true that Plaintiffs' repeatedly stipulated that § 1983 claims alleged in previous complaints did not apply to DHM and Dr. Sattah, those stipulations were limited to the previous complaints to which they related. See, e.g., ECF No. 79. More importantly, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing that their reliance on those stipulations would now prejudice them with respect to Plaintiffs' proposed Fourth Amended Complaint.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to establish that granting Plaintiffs' Motion will result in undue prejudice. Defendants must therefore make a strong showing that one of the remaining Foman factors favors denial of Plaintiffs' Motion in order to defeat the presumption in favor of granting the Motion. Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. They have not.

Defendant Benak's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion on the grounds of futility is moot. Benak argues that Plaintiffs' proposed Second Cause of Action is futile because Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim for failure to summon medical care against a health care provider under California Government Code section 845.6. ECF No. 109. Plaintiffs, however, have expressly waived their claim under Government Code section 845.6 with respect to Benak. ECF No. 110, at 3. Accordingly, Benak has failed to establish that Plaintiffs' proposed amendments are futile.3

Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs unduly delayed bringing § 1983 claims against Dr. Sattah and DHM. However, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that denying leave to amend solely on the grounds of undue delay is an abuse of discretion. Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, Defendants cannot meet their burden of persuading the court that justice requires denial based solely on an argument of undue delay. Stoddart v. Express Services, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-01054, 2015 WL 1812833 at *2 (E.D. Cal. April 20, 2015). Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend thus survives the Foman analysis.

B. Survival Rate Allegations

Defendants DHM and Sattah alternatively assert that if Plaintiffs are permitted to amend their complaint, the Court should forbid them from deleting the allegations about survival rates contained in Paragraph 39 of the ATAC. Defendant Sattah argues that the Court should strike any changes to Paragraph 39 as a sham, while DHM suggests that United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1984) forbids a party from altering factual allegations made in previous pleadings.

Both of Defendants' arguments are baseless. Defendant Sattah provides no evidence that removing the allegations contained in Paragraph 39 would make a sham out of Plaintiffs' proposed Fourth Amended Complaint. Indeed, Plaintiffs' decision to delete allegations about the survival rates of patients with hepatocellular carcinoma does not create a contradiction that supports a finding of any kind of fraud. See Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 763 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1144-45.

Furthermore, McKeon does not forbid a plaintiff from changing or deleting previously pled factual allegations in an amended complaint. Instead, McKeon explained that previous pleadings constitute "the admissions of a party-opponent and are admissible" to show that a plaintiff changed her stories. 738 F.2d 26, 31. Here, Defendants may exploit at trial Plaintiffs' decision to remove the survival rate allegations. Defendants cannot seriously contend, however, that Plaintiffs are forbidden from removing such allegations from an amended complaint. Because Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing that justice requires denying Plaintiffs leave to amend, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' Motion (ECF No. 102) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are directed to file their Fourth Amended Complaint no later than twenty (20) days from the date this order is electronically filed. Defendants' pending Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 98, 99, 103) are accordingly DENIED as moot. If Defendants choose to challenge Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint under Rule 12, the Court expects that Defendants will file a single, coordinated challenge on behalf of all parties.

IT IS SO ORDERED.