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U.S. v. AVERS, Cr.S-13-86-MCE. (2015)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20151208a61 Visitors: 6
Filed: Dec. 07, 2015
Latest Update: Dec. 07, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , Chief District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on November 19, 2015, now set on November 20, 2015. 2. By this stipulation, defendant Stormy Avers now moves to continue the status co
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on November 19, 2015, now set on November 20, 2015.

2. By this stipulation, defendant Stormy Avers now moves to continue the status conference until December 10, 2015 and to exclude time between November 19, 2015 and December 10, 2015 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate and request that the Court find the following:

a. The parties have agreed upon a resolution of the charges against the defendant. b. The reasons for this continuance are to allow the United States Attorney's Office additional time to obtain the needed Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Prosecuendum, since defendant is currently in state custody, and to finalize the plea agreement.

c. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

d. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 19, 2015 to December 10, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

DATED: December 2, 2015 BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney /s/Matthew Morris by Jan David Karowsky with Mr. Morris's approval by Matthew Morris Assistant U.S. Attorney

ORDER

The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. The Court specifically finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. It further finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and defendant in a speedy trial. Time from the date of the parties' stipulation, up to and including December 10, 2015 shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) T4 (reasonable time for counsel to prepare). It is further ordered that the November 20, 2015 status conference shall be continued until December 10, 2015at 9:00 a.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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