ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER SECTION 1983

(Doc. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge.

Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Lance Elliot Williams ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil action in Kern County Superior Court on October 23, 2014. Plaintiff seeks relief, in relevant part, for the violation of his federal constitutional rights, which are redressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Katavich and Kirkman ("Defendants") filed a notice of removal on April 16, 2015. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences," Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), but nevertheless, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Discussion

A. Summary of Complaint

Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at California Medical Facility in Vacaville, California, is seeking damages from Warden John Katavich, Correctional Officer K. Kirkman, a Doe Sergeant (Doe 2), and a Doe Captain (Doe 3) for violating his rights at Wasco State Prison ("WSP"). Plaintiff alleges that on April 4, 2014, he was received at WSP Reception Center. Defendant Kirkman entered the office where Plaintiff was answering a nurse's questions regarding his medications and medical issues. Plaintiff had his eyeglasses on his head, and Defendant Kirkman told him he could not have the eyeglasses and he would need to either get rid of them or send them home.

When Plaintiff exited the nurse's office, Defendant Kirkman was waiting for him and she told him to give her the glasses. Plaintiff said the glasses were his, they were paid for by his family, and he had a prescription for them. Plaintiff also told Defendant Kirkman that he had an appeal and a lot of other paperwork he needed his glasses to read, he uses special eye drops because his eyes are so bad, and he gets headaches from eye strain. Defendant Kirkman told him that he could give them to her and send them home or be written up for disobeying staff. Plaintiff gave Defendant Kirkman the glasses and when he asked about sending them home, she responded, "Later." (Doc. 1, Comp., 10:11.) Plaintiff repeatedly tried to ask Defendant Kirkman and other staff about sending his glasses home but they ignored him. Plaintiff was then assigned to D yard for housing.

Plaintiff alleges that he has a hard time reading and seeing, and he is in pain from eye strain and migraine headaches. Plaintiff alleges that the "intentional los[s] and or theft and or destruction" of his eyeglasses occurred "during an established state procedure [for] receiving inmates." (Id., 11:1-3.) Plaintiff has been unable to pursue a clerical job because of his pain, eye strain, and inability to read, and he has been forced to pursue physical labor jobs that cause him severe pain due to lower back injuries. Plaintiff also alleges that the confiscation of his eyeglasses left him unable to challenge his conviction or his level III prison classification, both of which were "unjust." (Id., 11:16-17.) Plaintiff's family is unable to afford to buy him another pair of eyeglasses and he has no other means to buy them.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kirkman stole, lost, or destroyed his eyeglasses, and she acted negligently and maliciously. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Doe 2 failed to supervise Defendant Kirkman and provide better training; Defendant Doe 3 failed to better train Doe 2; and Defendant Katavich should have better screened Defendants Kirkman, Doe 2, and Doe 3 before allowing them to work in the prison he oversees. Plaintiff alleges that these events violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

B. Claims Against Defendant Kirkman1

1. Section 1983 Claims Must be Premised on Federal Violation

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec'y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a link, or causal connection, between each defendant's actions or omissions and a violation of his federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff's allegations are suggestive of potential federal claims arising from (1) the deprivation of his personal property without due process, (2) the violation of his right to adequate medical treatment with respect to a need for prescription eyeglasses, and/or (3) the interference with his ability to challenge his conviction. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's allegations do not suffice to support constitutional claims under any of those theories.

2. Property Deprivation

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974 (1974), and prisoners have a protected interest in their personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). However, the Due Process Clause is not violated by the random, unauthorized deprivation of property so long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (1984); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation remedy under California law and therefore, he may not pursue a due process claim arising out of the negligent or intentional loss or theft of his personal property by Defendant Kirkman. Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-17 (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§810-895).

Although Plaintiff alleges that the deprivation was state-authorized, his allegation amounts to no more than a mere legal conclusion. The Due Process Clause is violated only when the agency "prescribes and enforces forfeitures of property without underlying statutory authority and competent procedural protections," and the events described by Plaintiff evidence an unauthorized deprivation of property by a state employee, which does not give rise to a federal claim. Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotations omitted).

3. Denial of Medically Necessary Eyeglasses

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to adequate medical care, but the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff "must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," and (2) that "the defendant's response to the need was deliberately indifferent." Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). Deliberate indifference is shown by "(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference." Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

Plaintiff's allegations do not support a claim that he had a serious medical need of which Defendant Kirkman knew and disregarded. Defendant Kirkman told Plaintiff he could not have his eyeglasses in the presence of a nurse, and there is no indication that medical staff at WSP — then or later — determined Plaintiff had a medical need for eyeglasses but nonetheless failed to provide them. The allegation that Defendant Kirkman confiscated Plaintiff's eyeglasses falls short of stating a viable claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment.

4. Denial of Access to the Courts

Finally, Plaintiff states that his ability to challenge his unjust conviction was hindered by the confiscation of his eyeglasses. Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (1996); Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009). However, to state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must show that he suffered an actual injury, which requires "actual prejudice to contemplated or existing litigation." Greene, 648 F.3d at 1018 (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348) (internal quotation marks omitted); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (2002); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Phillips, 588 F.3d at 655. Plaintiff's complaint is devoid of any indication that he suffered an actual injury with respect to a challenge to his criminal conviction and in the absence of any "actual injury," no federal claims lies.

C. Claim Against Defendants Katavich, Doe 2, and Doe 3

Plaintiff's claim against Defendants Katavich, Doe 2, and Doe 3 is premised on their failure to properly train and supervise subordinate staff. Section 1983 requires Plaintiff to link the named defendants to the participation in the violation at issue. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1020-21; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934, and a supervisor or administrator may only be held liable "if (1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation." Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff's allegations do not give rise to a cognizable claim for relief against Defendant Kirkman, a deficiency that fatally undercuts the basis for a claim against supervising staff. Notwithstanding that deficiency, a conclusory assertion that Defendants Katavich, Doe 2, and Doe 3 failed to properly train and supervise staff will not support a cognizable claim for relief under section 1983. Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977; Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074-75.

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. In an abundance of caution, the Court will grant Plaintiff one opportunity to amend. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint, George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007), and Plaintiff is cautioned that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading," Local Rule 220.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

IT IS SO ORDERED.