JOINT STIPULATION TO MODIFY THE SCHEDULING ORDER FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO COMPLETE DISCOVERY; DECLARATION OF WAUKEEN MCCOY IN SUPPORT THEREOF; [PROPOSED]

ORDER GRANTING THE REQUEST IN PART

(Doc. 63)

JENNIFER L. THURSTON, Magistrate Judge.

JOINT STIPULATION

Plaintiff TANYA SOLESBEE and Defendants, COUNTY OF INYO and ROBERT MAYHUGH, by and through their respective counsel of record, hereby stipulate that the deadlines in the May 13, 2015 Scheduling Order be extended to allow the parties to adequately complete the discovery needed to present all the issues to the Court.

WHEREAS, the operative complaint in this action was filed on August 25, 2014 in the United States District Court, Eastern District of California, by Plaintiff;

WHEREAS, on May 13, 2015, the Honorable Jennifer L. Thurston issued a Scheduling Order setting forth the discovery deadlines, non-dispositive motion deadlines, and dispositive motion deadlines;

WHEREAS, the Scheduling Order required non-expert discovery to be completed by February 15, 2016; expert discovery to be completed by April 25, 2016; non-dispositive motions to be filed by May 9, 2016 and a hearing by June 6, 2016; and dispositive motions to be filed by June 20, 2016 and a hearing by August 1, 2016;

WHEREAS the parties have engaged in written discovery, but meet and confer efforts to resolve discovery disputes have delayed production of responsive documents and the taking of depositions;

WHEREAS, the parties are engaging in a good faith settlement effort, but need further discovery in order to engage in meaningful settlement discussion;

WHEREAS, the parties have been meeting and conferring on an appropriate protective order to allow a full production of documents, which is necessary for Plaintiff to conduct the depositions of the Defendants;

WHEREAS, the parties believe they require a limited extension of time to complete discovery and file motions, without affecting the pretrial conference or trial dates established by the Court;

WHEREAS, the parties have not made any previous requests to extend any discovery deadlines in this action:

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between Plaintiff and Defendants, through their respective counsel, that the deadlines in the May 13, 2015 Scheduling Order be extended as follows:

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

Before the Court is the stipulation of counsel to extend the deadlines set forth in the scheduling order. (Doc. 66) The stipulation fails to set forth the reasons why they have not completed written discovery and indicates only that counsel have engaged in meet-and-confer efforts related to a discovery dispute. Id. at 2. They state further that this dispute has delayed them in taking depositions. Id. They say also that a dispute over drafting a protective order has also arisen and they are working on this.1 Id.

They do not explain why they waited until so late in the process to complete their discovery. As of November 2015, when they filed the mid-discovery status conference, it was apparent that counsel had made only a modest effort toward completing discovery. (Doc. 63 at 2) Though Plaintiff had propounded written discovery, responses were due in early November, suggesting that the discovery had not been propounded until late September or early October. County had propounded written discovery and had received responses. Id. Mayhugh had propounded no written discovery. Id. Despite this, no party suggested that they could not comply with the February 15, 2016 discovery deadline. Id. (As an aside, the Court notes that the February deadline was one they proposed at the time the Court developed the case schedule. (Doc. 54 at 6)) As a result, the Court admonished, "Counsel are reminded of their obligation to complete all discovery within the time frames set forth in the Scheduling Order." (Doc. 64)

Stipulations to amend the case schedule must demonstrate good cause and a determination whether this has been shown is informed by the diligence of the parties in conducting this discovery; unfortunately, this latter information has not been detailed in the stipulation. The case schedule informed counsel,

Failure to comply with this order may result in the imposition of sanctions.

(Doc. 57 at 8, emphasis in the original)

Scheduling orders are intended to alleviate case management problems. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992). As such, a scheduling order is "the heart of case management." Koplove v. Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15, 18 (3rd Cir. 1986). Further, scheduling orders are "not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril." Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610 (quoting Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equip. Co., 108 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Maine 1985)). The parties must "diligently attempt to adhere to the schedule throughout the course of the litigation." Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 607 (E.D. Cal. 1999).

Finally, the parties suggests significant changes to the case schedule while ignoring that the proposed amendments fail to provide Judge Ishii sufficient time to consider and decide any dispositive motions before the pretrial conference. As it stands the proposed hearing date for dispositive motions is a mere four days before the pretrial conference; this is insufficient. Judge Ishii needs eight weeks between the hearing on the motion and the pretrial conference. Thus, the proposed amended schedule is unworkable for the Court and cannot be granted. However, the Court will provide some assistance because there is a very minimal showing of good cause, though no showing of diligence. Thus, the Court ORDERS:

IT IS SO ORDERED.