AMENDED STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND TO EXCLUDE TIME

GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between Benjamin Wagner, U.S. Attorney, through Justin Lee, Assistant United States Attorney, attorney for Plaintiff, and Heather Williams, Federal Defender, through Assistant Federal Defender, Noa E. Oren, attorney for Dion Laroy Johnson II, and defendant, London Jamal Webb, by and through his counsel, William E. Bonham that the status conference set January 29, 2016, be continued to March 11, 2016 at 9:00 a.m.

The reason for this continuance is to allow defense counsel additional time to review discovery with the defendants, to examine possible defenses and to continue investigating the facts of the case.

Based upon the foregoing, the parties agree time under the Speedy Trial Act should be excluded of this order's date through and including March 11, 2016; pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) [reasonable time to prepare] and General Order 479, Local Code T4 based upon continuity of counsel and defense preparation.

Counsel and the defendants also agree that the ends of justice served by the Court granting this continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

ORDER

The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing, adopts the stipulation in its entirety as its order. The Court specifically finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and defendants in a speedy trial.

The Court orders the status conference rescheduled for March 11, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. The Court orders the time from the date of the parties stipulation, up to and including March 11, 2016, excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must commence under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7), and Local Code T4.