ORDER

ALLISON CLAIRE, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Raj Singh is proceeding in this action in pro per. This proceeding was referred to the undersigned by E.D. Cal. R. 302(c)(21). This matter came on for hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, and plaintiff's motions for default and default judgment. Based upon the motion papers and discussion with the parties at the hearing, it became clear that plaintiff Raj Singh intended to include Karen Singh a/k/a Kiran Rawat as a plaintiff in this action.1

However, in forma pauperis ("IFP") status was granted to plaintiff Raj Singh alone. See ECF No. 3; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Accordingly, Karen Singh a/k/a/Kiran Rawat will be ordered to file an IFP application for Karen Singh a/k/a Kiran Rawat, or the filing fee will have to be paid.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is suing the City of Sacramento for taking his properties without just compensation, and without due process. Complaint (ECF No. 1). The City moves to dismiss on the grounds that (1) Raj Singh is not the owner of the properties, and that only Kiran Rawat is the owner; and (2) the action is brought outside Section 1983's two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff moves for default judgment.2

II. THE COMPLAINT

The Complaint alleges that "from 2012 through the present," or "from 2012 to 2014," the City declared plaintiff's properties "uninhabitable," terminated city services to the properties, boarded-up the properties, and then demolished the buildings "without informing the owners," without providing a due process hearing, and without just compensation.

The Complaint asserts claims under Section 1983, for illegal search and seizure, deprivation of property without due process, and the taking of property without just compensation. It also alleges state claims.

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

Relying on documents for which they seek judicial notice, defendants argue that neither the caption plaintiff (Raj Singh), nor the complaint plaintiffs (Raj Singh and Karen Singh), have standing, because the property at issue was owned at all relevant times by Kiran Rawat, Trustee of the Sitaram Trust. ECF No. 15-1 at 11-12. They also argue that the two-year statute of limitations has expired because plaintiff's claims "began to accrue at the point in time the Complaint alleges the City first deprived plaintiffs of their rights with respect to the subject properties," namely, 2010 or 2012. ECF No. 15-1 at 12.

A. Dismissal Standards

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the Complaint. N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). "Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It is insufficient for the pleading to contain a statement of facts that "merely creates a suspicion" that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action. Id. (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235 35 (3d ed. 2004)). Rather, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint," construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiffs' favor. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 3055 (2011); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010). However, the court need not accept as true, legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations, or allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), as amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (2001).

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Pro se complaints are construed liberally and may only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014). A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint's deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).

B. Requests for Judicial Notice

"A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information." Fed. R. Evid. 201(d). "A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

C. Analysis

1. Request for Judicial Notice

The City seeks judicial notice of Exhibit 1 (ECF No. 15-3 at 1-79), showing plaintiff Raj Singh's status as a vexatious litigant in state court. See ECF No. 15-3 at 5 & 68. The City does not cite this document for any argument or assertion. It also offers no explanation why this document is relevant to this motion or to this case, and the relevance of the document is not apparent from its face. The request for judicial notice of this document will therefore be denied.

The City also seeks judicial notice of Exhibits 2-4 (ECF No. 15-3 at 81, 83-84, 86-88), showing that the properties at issue are owned by Kiran Rawat. These documents are therefore relevant to this motion, and according to the face of the documents, or the representations of the attorney for the City, they are recorded at the County Recorder's Office. See ECF No. 15-2 ¶¶ 2-4). The request for judicial notice of these documents will therefore be granted.

2. Standing

The City argues that plaintiff has no standing because Kiran Rawat is the owner of the subject properties, not Raj Singh. However, plaintiff Raj Singh asserts in his papers, and confirmed at the hearing on the motion, that Karen Singh, whom he intended to include as a plaintiff, is the same person as Kiran Rawat. Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion To Dismiss (ECF No. 17) at 2 ("Defendant states that Kiran Rawat AKA Karen Singh is the owner of the subject properties. Karen Singh is named plaintiff here."). Indeed, defendants' own motion identifies "Kiran Rawat" as being the trustee of the Sitaram Trust, which is essentially the same way Karen Singh is described in the Complaint.3

Since plaintiff, proceeding without counsel, intended to name Karen Singh a/k/a/Kiran Rawat as a plaintiff in this case, and since Rawat will be added as a plaintiff (upon paying the filing fee or being granted IFP status), the motion to dismiss for lack of standing will be denied.

3. Statute of Limitations

a. The two year statute of limitations applies

The statute of limitations for plaintiff's Section 1983 claims is two years, incorporating California's limitations period for personal injury claims. Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 761 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 980 (2015). The same limitations period applies even for a "takings" claim for injury to property. Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651, 655 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Taking claims must be brought under § 1983," and in California, are also subject to the limitations period applicable to personal injury claims), cert. dismissed, 543 U.S. 1041 (2004).

Plaintiff cites Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989) for the proposition that the limitations period is three years — not two — when injury to property is involved. See ECF No. 17 at 2. Plaintiff's argument is understandable, but incorrect. The statute of limitations for all Section 1983 claims is the same as the limitations period applicable to "residual or general personal injury" claims under the applicable state law. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989). In Owens, New York's law applied, and that limitations period was three years. Owens, 488 U.S. at 251 ("The Court of Appeals therefore correctly applied New York's 3-year statute of limitations governing general personal injury actions to respondent Okure's claim"). Here, California's law applies, and that limitations period is two years. Jackson, 749 F.3d at 761 (citing the two year personal injury limitations period provided by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1).

b. Accrual of the claim

A Section 1983 claim accrues — and the statute of limitations clock starts running — "when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999); Lukovsky v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (same), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1183 (2009).

The City asserts that plaintiff's claims "accrued" in 2010 or 2012, when the City first allegedly started violating his rights. However, the Complaint is vague as to dates; it does not show that plaintiff's injuries occurred in 2010 or 2012. While this form of pleading is not ideal, the fact is that plaintiff is not required to plead specific dates so as to defeat a statute of limitations defense. Plaintiff will have an opportunity to amend his complaint to be more specific about dates, but will not be required to do so.

The Complaint does allege that "[f]rom 2012 through present," the City stopped providing trash service and "declared both properties uninhabitable," among other things. Complaint ¶¶ 13, 14. If the ending of the trash service and the declaration that the properties was uninhabitable are the injuries plaintiff is basing his Section 1983 claim on, and if those things occurred in 2012, then indeed the claim — as to those injuries — may well be barred by the two-year statute of limitations. However, the complaint is worded in such a way that the court cannot determine for certain that those events occurred — as to both properties — in 2012. The complaint, read in the light most favorable to plaintiff, can be read to allege that although some objectionable conduct may have occurred in 2010 or 2012, a distinct injury may have occurred within the statute of limitations.

Moreover, the Complaint alleges that plaintiff's properties were illegally boarded up and then demolished, with no hearing and no just compensation, sometime between 2010 and 2014 or between 2010 and the present. There is no date specified for those actions. The specific dates for each alleged injury is best left to an amended complaint, if plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, or to a motion for summary judgment.

IV. MOTION FOR DEFAULT AND FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff requests the entry of a default and a default judgment against the City. The City was served on or about October 30, 2015 or November 16, 2015. ECF No. 11 (U.S. Marshal Process Receipt and Return, and Waiver of Service and Summons). The City waived service of the summons on November 16, 2015, and filed a responsive pleading on December 28, 2015, within the 60 days allowed to do so (whether reckoned from October 30th or November 16th). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3). There is no evidence that any other defendant was ever served.

Accordingly, no defendant is in default.

At the hearing on this matter, plaintiff indicated that a private entity effected service independently of the U.S. Marshal. However, there is no evidence of any other service other than that filed by the U.S. Marshal. Even if plaintiff could show that the City missed the deadline for filing its responsive pleading, it plainly is participating in the litigation now and plaintiff has not shown any harm resulting from any alleged delay. Accordingly, any default the City may have incurred would be set aside.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Going forward, the party caption for this case is "Raj Singh, and Karen Singh a/k/a Kiran Rawat v. City of Sacramento." Raj Singh and Karen Singh are cautioned that no pro se plaintiff may represent anyone other than himself or herself in this litigation, nor submit pleadings on behalf of another.

2. Within 10 days of this order, Karen Singh a/k/a Kiran Rawat shall file an application to proceed in forma pauperis, or the required filing fee must be paid.

3. Defendant's requests for judicial notice are GRANTED as to Exhibits 2-4, and otherwise DENIED.

4. Defendant's Motion To Dismiss (ECF No. 15), is DENIED in its entirety.

5. Notwithstanding the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff is granted 30 days to file an amended complaint, if he chooses to do so. No leave is required to amend, or to add Karen Singh a/k/a Kiran Rawat as a plaintiff.

6. Plaintiff's Request to Enter Default and Default Judgment (ECF No. 17), is DENIED.

7. By separate Minute Order, the court will re-schedule an initial Status Conference. The parties shall comply with the instructions set forth in ECF No. 5 (Order Setting Status Conference) and its attachments, in connection with the Status Conference and the form regarding "Consent or Decline to Consent to Jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge."